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APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS FROM A STIPULATION ENTERED BY CONSENT, IT WAS NOT FROM AN APPEALABLE ORDER UNDER CPLR 5701, AND THE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A PRIOR APPEAL, COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE COURT OF THE PRIOR DISMISSED APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined the appeal must be dismissed for three reasons: the stipulation appealed from was entered into by consent, the appeal is not from an appealable order under CPLR 5701, and the matters raised on appeal could have been raised on a prior appeal. The court noted that counsel should have informed the court of the prior dismissed appeal:

We now dismiss the instant appeal for the following three reasons. First, defendant is not aggrieved by the “Stipulation and Order” on appeal because, as its title reflects, it constitutes an order entered on consent. As such, defendant “may not appeal from it” (…  see CPLR 5511…). The fact that defendant is aggrieved by the prior summary judgment order is of no moment because the “Stipulation and Order” is not a final order or judgment, and it thus does not bring up for review that prior order … .

Second, the appeal must be dismissed because the paper from which defendant purports to appeal is not an appealable order under CPLR 5701 (a) (2), which authorizes an appeal as of right from certain specified orders “where the motion it decided was made upon notice.” That provision is inapplicable here because the “Stipulation and Order” on appeal did not decide a motion, much less a motion made on notice … .

Third, it is well established that “[a]n appeal that has been dismissed for failure to prosecute bars, on the merits, a subsequent appeal as to all questions that could have been raised on the earlier appeal had it been perfected” … . Defendant’s substantive contentions on the instant appeal could have been raised on the prior appeal, had it been perfected. Thus, dismissal of the instant appeal is also warranted on that ground … . …

Finally, given the parties’ failure to inform us of the prior dismissed appeal in their appellate briefs, we must remind counsel that “attorneys for litigants in [an appellate] court have an obligation to keep the court informed of all . . . matters pertinent to the disposition of a pending appeal and cannot, by agreement between them, . . . predetermine the scope of [its] review”  … . Dumond v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 07853, Fourth Dept 11-16-18

APPEALS (APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS FROM A STIPULATION ENTERED BY CONSENT, IT WAS NOT FROM AN APPEALABLE ORDER UNDER CPLR 5701, AND THE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A PRIOR APPEAL, COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE COURT OF THE PRIOR DISMISSED APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/cIVIL PROCEDURE (APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS FROM A STIPULATION ENTERED BY CONSENT, IT WAS NOT FROM AN APPEALABLE ORDER UNDER CPLR 5701, AND THE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A PRIOR APPEAL, COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE COURT OF THE PRIOR DISMISSED APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/CPLR 5701  (APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS FROM A STIPULATION ENTERED BY CONSENT, IT WAS NOT FROM AN APPEALABLE ORDER UNDER CPLR 5701, AND THE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A PRIOR APPEAL, COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE COURT OF THE PRIOR DISMISSED APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS  (APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS FROM A STIPULATION ENTERED BY CONSENT, IT WAS NOT FROM AN APPEALABLE ORDER UNDER CPLR 5701, AND THE ISSUES COULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN A PRIOR APPEAL, COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED THE COURT OF THE PRIOR DISMISSED APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT)

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