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PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK WHEN HE FELL, LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined defendant’s summary judgment motion on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly granted. Although plaintiff fell when attempting to replace light bulbs in a strobe light on top of a van, he was not involved in construction work:

Labor Law § 240(1) “does not cover routine maintenance done outside the context of construction work” … . The replacement of “components that require replacement in the course of normal wear and tear” constitutes routine maintenance … . At the time of his fall, the plaintiff was engaged in the task of replacing burnt out light bulbs, which constitutes routine maintenance and therefore falls outside of the scope of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, his work did not take place in the context of a larger project which “encompassed activity protected under the statute … . Trotman v Verizon Communications, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07483, Second Dept 11-7-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK WHEN HE FELL, LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT))

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