LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED CROSS CLAIMS BECAUSE THAT RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED, PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW BECAUSE IT DID NOT MAINTAIN A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, in a comprehensive decision, over a comprehensive dissent, determined that the general contractor, Ultimate, was not liable under Labor Law 200 for plaintiff’s fall through an opening in planks and plywood covering a stairwell opening because the accident was attributable to the manner of the work and Ultimate did not exercise any supervisory control over the installation of drywall by the plaintiff. The dissent argued that there was a question of fact whether the opening in the stairwell covering was a dangerous condition of which Ultimate had notice, which is also a ground for liability under Labor Law 200. The Second Department noted that the court should not have sua sponte dismissed Ultimate’s cross claims against the drywall company (Fortin) because such relief was not requested. The Second Department further noted that Fortin was not entitled to protection from plaintiff’s suit under the Workers’ Compensation Law on the ground that plaintiff was Fortin’s employee because Fortin did not maintain a Workers’ Compensation policy:

“Labor Law § 200(1) is a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide workers with a safe place to work”… . “Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories: namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” … . Where “a claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers arising from a subcontractor’s methods or materials, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had unless it is shown that the party to be charged exercised some supervisory control over the operation” … . “A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” … . “[M]ere general supervisory authority at a work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200” … . …

… Ultimate established, … that the accident arose from the method and manner in which the plaintiff and Jean-Guy Fortin covered the stairwell opening … . …

The Supreme Court should not have, in effect, sua sponte, directed dismissal of Ultimate’s cross claims against Fortin for common-law indemnification and contribution, which relief Fortin did not request in its motion papers… . Moreover, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Ultimate’s motion which was for summary judgment on its cross claim against Fortin for common-law indemnification. Contrary to Fortin’s contention, Ultimate’s cross claims are not barred by Workers’ Compensation Law § 11. … Ultimate established that Fortin did not procure workers’ compensation on behalf of the plaintiff … . Therefore, Fortin is not entitled to the benefit of the workers’ compensation bar. Poulin v Ultimate Homes, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 07468, Second Dept 11-7-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED CROSS CLAIMS BECAUSE THAT RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED, PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW BECAUSE IT DID NOT MAINTAIN A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUA SPONTE, LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED CROSS CLAIMS BECAUSE THAT RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED, PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW BECAUSE IT DID NOT MAINTAIN A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/JUDGES (SUA SPONTE, LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED CROSS CLAIMS BECAUSE THAT RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED, PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW BECAUSE IT DID NOT MAINTAIN A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY (SECOND DEPT))/WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED CROSS CLAIMS BECAUSE THAT RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED, PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO PROTECTION FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW BECAUSE IT DID NOT MAINTAIN A WORKERS’ COMPENSATION POLICY (SECOND DEPT)