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EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined (1) defendant should have been allowed to present expert evidence of the cross-race effect on the ability of a witness to identify a defendant, and (2) the request to instruct the jury on the cross-race effect should have been granted. The First Department further held that the new (2017) cross-racial identification rule should be applied cases like this one, where the rule was announced while the direct appeal was pending:

The court should have permitted defendant to introduce expert testimony to the effect that witnesses are less likely to accurately identify persons of other racial groups than persons of their own race … . The case turned on the accuracy of the victim’s cross-racial identification of defendant, and there was no corroborating evidence connecting defendant to the crime. Furthermore, the circumstances surrounding the identification did not render it so reliable as to justify precluding expert testimony. The expert testimony produced during the Frye hearing sufficiently established that the cross-race effect has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The People do not dispute that this phenomenon applies to identifications of certain racial groups. Moreover it can be deduced from the expert testimony that the cross-race effect applies to all racial groups.

The court should also have granted defendant’s explicit request for a jury instruction on cross-racial identification. Initially, we reject the People’s argument that defendant failed to preserve this issue.

People v Boone (30 NY3d 521, 535-536 [2017]), which requires that a jury charge on the cross-race effect be given on request, should be applied retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. Boone plainly announces a new rule, and that rule is plainly based on state rather than federal law. Accordingly, its application to cases pending on appeal is not automatic, but depends on a balancing of the three factors set forth in the Mitchell-Pepper test … .

As to the first factor (the purpose of the rule), “standards that go to the heart of a reliable determination of guilt or innocence will be applied retroactively, but decisions which are only collateral to or relatively far removed from the fact-finding process at trial apply prospectively only” … . Here, cross-racial identification instructions go to the fact-finding process, and are essential to a reliable determination of guilt or innocence… . Thus, the first factor favors retroactive application.

As to the second factor (extent of reliance on the old rule), the People cite a number of cases showing that courts have relied on the pre-Boone rule in declining to give a charge on cross-racial identification, in the exercise of discretion. This favors prospective application of the rule, but we do not find that it outweighs the other factors.

As to the third factor (effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application), retroactive application of Boone would not significantly affect the administration of justice. A limited number of cases turn on the accuracy of single-witness, cross-racial identifications, and the particular evidence could render a failure to give a cross-racial identification charge harmless. Moreover, the rule in Boone is expressly limited to cases where the charge has been requested … , and the fact that Boone had not yet been decided at the time of a particular trial would not provide an exemption from the requirement of a timely request … . Thus, contrary to the People’s contention, it is unlikely that retroactive application of Boone would result in wholesale reversals and burden trial courts with unnecessary retrials … . People v Crovador, 2018 NY Slip Op 07273, First Dept 10-30-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IDENTIFICATION, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/EXPERT EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, IDENTIFICATION, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW RULING, (EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))/RETROACTIVE APPLICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE CROSS-RACE EFFECT ON THE ABILITY TO IDENTIFY THE PERPETRATOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED, THE REQUEST TO GIVE THE CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION JURY INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE NEW (2017) RULING ON CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION SHOULD BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED TO CASES ON DIRECT APPEAL WHEN THE RULING WAS MADE (FIRST DEPT))

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