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THE ARBITRATOR-PANEL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER A PARTIAL FINAL AWARD IN THIS DISPUTE BETWEEN AN INSURER AND THE INSURED, THE PANEL INITIALLY FOUND THAT A $10 MILLION SETTLEMENT PAID BY THE INSURED WAS NOT A COVERED LOSS, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED ITSELF (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Kern, over a dissenting opinion, determined that the arbitrator-panel (JAMS) did not have the power to reconsider its initial finding (called a partial final award or PFA) that the $10 million settlement paid by Allied was not a “loss” within the meaning of the insurance policy issued to Allied by AISLIC. The parties had agreed to first decide whether the settlement constituted a “loss” and then determine the applicable costs stemming from the insured’s defense of the claim against it.  The First Department held that the arbitrator-panel did not have the authority to reconsider the initial PFA and reverse itself (finding that the settlement did actually constitute a “loss”) in the course of considering the defense and indemnification issues:

Here, when the panel reconsidered the PFA, it exceeded its authority based on the common law doctrine of functus officio. The doctrine of functus officio provides that absent an agreement to the contrary, after an arbitrator renders a final award, the arbitrator may not entertain an application to change the award, “except … to correct a deficiency of form or a miscalculation of figures or to eliminate matter not submitted”(…CPLR 7509; CPLR 7511[c]). “In order to be final,’ an arbitration award must be intended by the arbitrators to be their complete determination of all claims submitted to them” … . “Generally, in order for a claim to be completely determined, the arbitrators must have decided not only the issue of liability of a party on the claim, but also the issue of damages” … .

However, “the submission by the parties determines the scope of the arbitrators’ authority” … . Thus, “if the parties agree that the [arbitration] panel is to make a final decision as to part of the dispute, the arbitrators have the authority and responsibility to do so . . . [and] once [the] arbitrators have finally decided the submitted issues, they are, in common-law parlance, functus officio,’ meaning that their authority over those questions is ended” … . American Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v Allied Capital Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 07194, First Dept 10-25-18

ARBITRATION (THE ARBITRATOR-PANEL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER A PARTIAL FINAL AWARD IN THIS DISPUTE BETWEEN AN INSURER AND THE INSURED, THE PANEL INITIALLY FOUND THAT A $10 MILLION SETTLEMENT PAID BY THE INSURED WAS NOT A COVERED LOSS, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED ITSELF (FIRST DEPT))/INSURANCE LAW (ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR-PANEL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER A PARTIAL FINAL AWARD IN THIS DISPUTE BETWEEN AN INSURER AND THE INSURED, THE PANEL INITIALLY FOUND THAT A $10 MILLION SETTLEMENT PAID BY THE INSURED WAS NOT A COVERED LOSS, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED ITSELF (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR-PANEL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER A PARTIAL FINAL AWARD IN THIS DISPUTE BETWEEN AN INSURER AND THE INSURED, THE PANEL INITIALLY FOUND THAT A $10 MILLION SETTLEMENT PAID BY THE INSURED WAS NOT A COVERED LOSS, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED ITSELF (FIRST DEPT))/FUNCTUS OFFICIO (ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR-PANEL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO RECONSIDER A PARTIAL FINAL AWARD IN THIS DISPUTE BETWEEN AN INSURER AND THE INSURED, THE PANEL INITIALLY FOUND THAT A $10 MILLION SETTLEMENT PAID BY THE INSURED WAS NOT A COVERED LOSS, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED ITSELF (FIRST DEPT))

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