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ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROTHER AND SISTER TO SHARE MOTHER’S ESTATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the complaint stated causes of action for promissory estoppel and a constructive trust. Plaintiff alleged that his mother removed him from her will, not to disinherit him, but to prevent his former wife from sharing in the estate.  Plaintiff and defendant are brother and sister. The agreement regarding the disposition of the estate made between plaintiff and defendant violated the statute of frauds. However promissory estoppel may be applicable:

The amended complaint alleges that, both before the mother’s death and subsequent to it, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement whereby, essentially, defendant would be the sole heir to the estate, and would, among other things, give plaintiff his 50% share after completion of plaintiff’s divorce, and, until the final transfer of his share of the estate, defendant would maintain a life insurance policy of at least $5 million, with plaintiff as the sole beneficiary. Giving the complaint “the benefit of every possible favorable inference” … , it may be inferred that this oral agreement was in furtherance of the mother’s wishes, as her decision to remove plaintiff from the will was for the sole purpose of denying the former wife any access to the estate, and not an affirmative wish to disinherit plaintiff. In furtherance of the oral agreement, following the mother’s death, plaintiff paid the estate tax from his share of the mother’s life insurance policy.

… “[W]here the elements of promissory estoppel are established, and the injury to the party who acted in reliance on the oral promise is so great that enforcement of the statute of frauds would be unconscionable, the promisor should be estopped from reliance on the statute of frauds” … .

Plaintiff here has also sufficiently alleged the elements of his constructive trust claim … . Castellotti v Free, 2018 NY Slip Op 07045, First Dept 10-23-18

CONTRACT LAW (PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROTHER AND SISTER TO SHARE MOTHER’S ESTATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (FIRST DEPT))/PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL (ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROTHER AND SISTER TO SHARE MOTHER’S ESTATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (FIRST DEPT))/CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROTHER AND SISTER TO SHARE MOTHER’S ESTATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (FIRST DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROTHER AND SISTER TO SHARE MOTHER’S ESTATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, ALTHOUGH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BROTHER AND SISTER TO SHARE MOTHER’S ESTATE WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, THE COMPLAINT STATED CAUSES OF ACTION FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST (FIRST DEPT))

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