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THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT).

he First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s petition requesting a de novo jury trial on whether defendant is mentally ill should have been granted. The First Department held that the exception to the mootness doctrine applied to allow appeal, the denial of the petition was appealable as of right, and the remarks of defense counsel and the testimony of the defense expert at the hearing to the effect defendant is mentally ill did not waive defendant’s right to a trial de novo:

This case satisfies the exception to the mootness doctrine because there is “(1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues” … . Commitment and retention proceedings generally involve orders of short duration, which typically evade review … . Moreover, the issue before us is substantial, as it requires us to decide whether statements by defendant’s counsel and his expert could operate to deprive a defendant of his statutory right to demand a jury trial de novo on the “basic liberty issue” of whether he can be confined … . …

… [T]there can be no serious dispute that the order of the motion court, which denied defendant the opportunity to present his case before a jury, as provided for under CPL 330.20(16), affected a substantial right. * * * Since the motion court’s order affected a substantial right of defendant, we hold that his appeal is properly before us as one taken as of right under CPLR 5701(a)(2)(v). * * *

Here, defendant timely expressed his dissatisfaction with a recommitment order that was based on a threshold finding that he had a mental illness. Once defendant met those core requirements, he was entitled to a de novo trial at which a jury would decide whether he was mentally ill based on the evidence then existing. Matter of New York State Off. of Mental Health v Marco G., 2018 NY Slip Op 06998, First Dept 10-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CPL 330.20, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))/MOOTNESS DOCTRINE (APPEALS, CRIMINAL LAW, CPL 330.20, MENTAL ILLNESS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR A DE NOVO JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS MENTALLY ILL IS APPEALABLE AS OF RIGHT AND THE PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AN EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE APPLIED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL’S STATEMENTS AND THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING TO THE EFFECT DEFENDANT WAS MENTALLY ILL DID NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO A DE NOVO TRIAL (FIRST DEPT))

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