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FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly searched the record and granted defendant’s summary judgment in this action on a promissory note. The agreement at issue was an illegal contract involving a fee-splitting arrangement between physicians and non-physicians which is prohibited by the Education Law:

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to deny those branches of the plaintiff’s motion which were for summary judgment on the causes of action to recover the balance due on the promissory note and for an award of costs and attorney’s fees, and, upon searching the record, to award the defendants summary judgment dismissing those causes of action. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the evidence submitted by the parties in connection with the motion for summary judgment established, prima facie, that the agreement and the promissory note were a pretext for an unlawful fee-splitting arrangement in violation of the Education Law because they circumvented New York’s prohibition on physicians splitting fees with nonphysicians (see Education Law §§ 6509-a, 6530[19] … ). “It is the settled law of this State (and probably of every other State) that a party to an illegal contract cannot ask a court of law to help him [or her] carry out his [or her] illegal object, nor can such a person plead or prove in any court a case in which he [or she], as a basis for his [or her] claim, must show forth his [or her] illegal purpose” … . “Where the parties’ arrangement is illegal the law will not extend its aid to either of the parties . . . or listen to their complaints against each other, but will leave them where their own acts have placed them'” … . Linchitz Practice Mgt., Inc. v Daat Med. Mgt., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06891, Second Dept 10-17-18

CONTRACT LAW (FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT))/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT))/PHYSICIANS (FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT))/FEE-SPLITTING (PHYSICIANS, FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION LAW (PHYSICIANS, FEE-SPLITTING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND NON-PHYSICIANS IS ILLEGAL UNDER THE EDUCATION LAW AND CANNOT BE ENFORCED BY THE COURTS, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY SEARCHED THE RECORD AND AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION ON A PROMISSORY NOTE (SECOND DEPT))

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