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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE PROJECT OWNER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES TO AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER CASE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that several causes of action in this Labor Law 240 (1) ladder-fall case should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff's employer (nonparty Capitol) was hired as a subcontractor by Ruggles, which had a contract for signage and awnings with the operator of the retail store for which the work was done (Express). Express had hired Russco to act as the general contractor for the renovation work. Russco had the authority to hire all subcontractors with the exception of the signage and awning work:

Russco's [the general contractor's] motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim as against it on the ground that it is not a proper defendant under the Labor Law was correctly denied as there is an issue of fact as to whether its obligations as the general contractor on the project extended to the work performed by plaintiff. … … [T]he contract … provides that Russco is responsible for “taking all reasonable safety precautions to prevent injury or death to persons or damage to property” and that such responsibility extends “to the protection of all employees on the Project and all other persons who may be affected by the Work in any way” … . * * *

Ruggles is a proper Labor Law § 240(1) defendant because it was a statutory agent of Express, the owner of the project. It is undisputed that Express hired Ruggles as the sole contractor responsible for the manufacture and installation of all signage and awning work on the project, which was the work that plaintiff was performing when he sustained his injuries. Although Russco may be found liable based on its site safety obligations with regard to the signage and awning work, there is no question that, pursuant to the contract between Ruggles and Express, Ruggles was delegated the supervision and control over such work. Moreover, Ruggles may not escape liability under Labor Law § 240(1) based on its delegation of the signage and awning work to Capitol, plaintiff's employer. White v 31-01 Steinway, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06685, First Dept 10-9-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE PROJECT OWNER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES TO AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER CASE (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENTS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE PROJECT OWNER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES TO AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER CASE (FIRST DEPT))/AGENTS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, STATUTORY AGENTS, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE PROJECT OWNER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES TO AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER CASE (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE PROJECT OWNER ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES TO AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) LADDER CASE (FIRST DEPT))

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