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LAW OFFICE FAILURE ALLEGATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT VACATING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the law-office-failure allegations were insufficient to warrant vacating a default judgment:

While the court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005…), “[a] party attributing his or her default to a former attorney must provide a detailed and credible explanation of the default. Conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of law office failure are not sufficient” … . “[M]ere neglect is not a reasonable excuse” … .

Contrary to [defendant's] contention, it failed to provide a detailed and credible explanation of the default, and no other evidence was submitted to corroborate the allegation of law office failure … . Accordingly, [defendant's] “bare allegations of incompetence on the part of prior counsel” … were insufficient to establish an excusable default under CPLR 5015(a)(1) … . Torres v Rely On Us, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06587, Second Dept 10-3-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LAW OFFICE FAILURE ALLEGATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT VACATING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 2005 (LAW OFFICE FAILURE ALLEGATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT VACATING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5015 (LAW OFFICE FAILURE ALLEGATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT VACATING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (LAW OFFICE FAILURE ALLEGATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT VACATING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/LAW OFFICE FAILURE (LAW OFFICE FAILURE ALLEGATIONS INSUFFICIENT TO WARRANT VACATING A DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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