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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE BASED ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant's motion to cancel and discharge the mortgage based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations should have been granted. The court noted that Supreme Court's imposition of an equitable mortgage was improper under the facts:

RPAPL 1501(4) provides that “[w]here the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitation for the commencement of an action to foreclose a mortgage . . . has expired,” any person with an estate or interest in the property may maintain an action “to secure the cancellation and discharge of record of such encumbrance, and to adjudge the estate or interest of the plaintiff in such real property to be free therefrom”… .

Here, the defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on her counterclaim pursuant to RPAPL 1501(4) to cancel and discharge the mortgage by demonstrating that more than six years had passed since the mortgage was accelerated and therefore this foreclosure action was time-barred … . The plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact in opposition … . Thus, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was for summary judgment on her counterclaim pursuant to RPAPL 1501(4) to cancel and discharge the mortgage (see CPLR 213[4]; RPAPL 1501[4]…).

We disagree with the Supreme Court's determination to impose an equitable mortgage in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff never requested this relief, and the defendant was not afforded any notice nor an opportunity to be heard on this issue which amounted to a denial of the defendant's due process rights … . In any event, the doctrine of equitable mortgage is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case, where a legal written mortgage existed … . 21st Mtge. Corp. v Nweke, 2018 NY Slip Op 06509, Second Dept 10-3-18

FORECLOSURE (DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE BASED ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (FORECLOSURE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE BASED ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE BASED ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT))/EQUITABLE MORTGAGE  (DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE BASED ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, NO GROUNDS FOR IMPOSING AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT))

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