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SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE AN INADEQUATE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim in this slip and fall case should have been granted. Petitioner alleged she tripped and fell over unsecured floor mats as she was leaving the school after her grandson's basketball game. The Second Department noted that the school had done an investigation and thereby had timely notice of the facts of the claim:

… [A]lthough the petitioner's notice of claim was not served within 90 days of the accident, the respondent acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accident … . In fact, the respondent conducted an investigation into whether it was a proper defendant in a personal injury action. In addition, the petitioner made an initial showing that the respondent was not substantially prejudiced by the delay, since the respondent acquired timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within the 90-day period, conducted an investigation, and notified its insurance carrier of the accident … .

In opposition, the respondent failed to make a particularized evidentiary showing that it would be substantially prejudiced if the late notice was allowed … . The respondent's contention that it was prejudiced because the particular mats over which the petitioner tripped had been replaced after the accident is without merit. The record shows that the respondent's Director of Facilities sent an email on the morning following the petitioner's accident in which he indicated that he was aware of the fact that the petitioner tripped over the mats in the vestibule. Contrary to the respondent's contention, any prejudice resulting from the replacement of the subject mats was due to the respondent's practice of changing the mats on a weekly basis rather than from the petitioner's delay in serving a notice of claim. Under these circumstances, the failure of the respondent to inspect the mats that were on the ground on the date of the petitioner's accident was not caused by the delay in serving a notice of claim … .

…[W]hile the excuses proffered by the petitioner for her failure to file a timely notice of claim were not reasonable, the absence of a reasonable excuse is not in and of itself fatal to the petition where, as here, there was actual notice and an absence of prejudice … . Matter of Messick v Greenwood Lake Union Free Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 06244, Second Dept 9-26-18

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE AN INADEQUATE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SLIP AND FALL, SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE AN INADEQUATE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NOTICE OF CLAIM, SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE AN INADEQUATE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, SLIP AND FALL, SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE AN INADEQUATE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL  (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90 DAYS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE DELAY IN FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DESPITE AN INADEQUATE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT))

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