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INDICTMENT CHARGING CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE THE POSSESSION WAS OUTSIDE DEFENDANT’S HOME OR BUSINESS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant's conviction, determined the indictment was jurisdictionally defective. The indictment charged criminal possession  of a weapon but did not allege the possession was outside the defendant's home or business:

The defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under Penal Law § 265.03 must be vacated. Penal Law § 265.03(3) exempts from criminal liability under that subdivision a person's possession of a loaded firearm when such possession takes place in the person's home or place of business. In this case, the indictment charging a violation of Penal Law § 265.03(3) failed to allege that the defendant's possession of the subject weapon was outside of his home or place of business… . As correctly conceded by the People, this omission rendered that count of the indictment jurisdictionally defective, which is a type of defect that is not waivable … . People v Tromp, 2018 NY Slip Op 06275, Second Dept 9-26-18

CRIMINAL LAW (INDICTMENT CHARGING CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE THE POSSESSION WAS OUTSIDE DEFENDANT'S HOME OR BUSINESS (SECOND DEPT))/INDICTMENTS  (INDICTMENT CHARGING CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE THE POSSESSION WAS OUTSIDE DEFENDANT'S HOME OR BUSINESS (SECOND DEPT))/WEAPON, CRIMINAL POSSESSION (INDICTMENT CHARGING CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE THE POSSESSION WAS OUTSIDE DEFENDANT'S HOME OR BUSINESS (SECOND DEPT))

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SCHOOL HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS OF THE SLIP AND FALL CLAIM WITHIN 90... TRIAL JUDGE’S HANDLING OF JURY NOTES CONSTITUTED A MODE OF PROCEEDINGS...