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NOTICE PURPORTING TO DISSOLVE A PARTNERSHIP WAS A NULLITY BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPORT WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the notice issued by two partners purporting to dissolve the partnership was a nullity because the notice did not comport with the relevant provisions of the partnership agreement:

On October 15, 2015, two of the partners issued a notice purporting to withdraw from and dissolve the partnerships, pursuant to New York Partnership Law § 62(1)(b), “which,” the notice said, “provides that a partnership is terminable at will on notice.” * * *

“New York's Partnership Law creates default provisions that fill gaps in partnership agreements, but where the agreement clearly states the means by which a partnership will dissolve, or other aspects of partnership dissolution, it is the agreement that governs the change in relations between partners and the future of the business” … . Where, as here, a partnership agreement contains provisions governing the dissolution of the partnership by the will of the partners, ordinary contract principles apply … , and a notice by a partner or partners to dissolve a partnership in contravention of the partnership agreement's dissolution provisions is a legal nullity and does not effect a dissolution of the partnership. Wiener v Weissman, 2018 NY Slip Op 06205, First Dept 9-26-18

PARTNERSHIP LAW (NOTICE PURPORTING TO DISSOLVE A PARTNERSHIP WAS A NULLITY BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPORT WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (FIRST DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (PARTNERSHIP LAW, NOTICE PURPORTING TO DISSOLVE A PARTNERSHIP WAS A NULLITY BECAUSE IT DID NOT COMPORT WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (FIRST DEPT))

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