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DEFAULT NOTICE WAS NOT A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT START RUNNING FROM THE DATE OF THE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined the language in a letter was not sufficient to trigger the acceleration of the debt, which, in turn, would have started the the running of the statute of limitations for a foreclosure action:

In June 2005, nonparty Cecilia Adebola executed a promissory note in the sum of $549,000 in favor of Fremont Investment & Loan [FBP] secured by a mortgage encumbering real property located in Brooklyn. After Adebola defaulted under the terms of the note and mortgage, the loan servicer sent her a notice of default dated July 3, 2006. The notice of default stated, in relevant part, that “[i]f the default is not cured on or before August 7, 2006, the mortgage payments will be accelerated with the full amount . . . becoming due and payable in full, and foreclosure proceedings will be initiated at that time.” * * *

Here, it is clear from the record that FBP cannot establish that the notice of default letter was a clear and unequivocal acceleration of the mortgage … . The notice of default “was nothing more than a letter discussing acceleration as a possible future event, which does not constitute an exercise of the mortgage's optional acceleration clause” … . Fbp 250, LLC v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2018 NY Slip Op 06082, Second Dept 9-19-18

FORECLOSURE (DEFAULT NOTICE WAS NOT A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT START RUNNING FROM THE DATE OF THE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT))/ACCELERATION OF MORTGAGE  (DEFAULT NOTICE WAS NOT A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCELERATION OF THE MORTGAGE, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT START RUNNING FROM THE DATE OF THE NOTICE (SECOND DEPT))

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