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ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF, THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT, WHO HAS BEEN DEPORTED, ARGUED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY BUT FOR HIS ATTORNEY’S ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defendant's motion to vacate his conviction based upon ineffective assistance of counsel was properly denied. Seventeen years ago defendant pled guilty after being informed by his lawyer that he would not be subject to deportation. Although the First Department agreed that Supreme Court used the wrong standard of proof for analyzing ineffective assistance, the First Department held Supreme Court's finding that defendant's testimony at the hearing was not credible was a sufficient basis for denying the motion:

The motion court accepted defendant's “uncontested assertion” in his affirmation that his attorney told him that his guilty plea would not result in negative immigration consequences such as deportation, and found that he had thus established the first of the two necessary prongs for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v Washington (466 US 668, 688 [1984]), that is, that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” * * *

… [T]he second prong of the Strickland test [is] whether “there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”  … . …

Defendant's principal argument on appeal is that the hearing court applied the wrong evidentiary standard in applying the Strickland test. He maintains that the only relevant inquiry was whether there was a “reasonable probability” that he would have proceeded to trial had he known that his guilty plea would result in deportation proceedings. … This part of defendant's argument is meritorious … .

… The court made a specific finding that defendant, the only witness, was not credible, a determination that is entitled to “great deference” … . His lack of credibility negates any conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that he would have proceeded to trial but for his attorney's misadvice. People v Pinilla, 2018 NY Slip Op 05960, First Dept 8-30-18

CRIMINAL LAW (ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF, THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT, WHO HAS BEEN DEPORTED, ARGUED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY BUT FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION (FIRST DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF, THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT, WHO HAS BEEN DEPORTED, ARGUED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY BUT FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION (FIRST DEPT))/DEPORTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF, THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT, WHO HAS BEEN DEPORTED, ARGUED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY BUT FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF, THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT, WHO HAS BEEN DEPORTED, ARGUED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY BUT FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT USED THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF, THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY AT THE HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS NOT CREDIBLE JUSTIFIED DENIAL OF THE MOTION, DEFENDANT, WHO HAS BEEN DEPORTED, ARGUED HE WOULD NOT HAVE PLED GUILTY BUT FOR HIS ATTORNEY'S ASSURANCE HE WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO DEPORTATION (FIRST DEPT))

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