You are here: / / THEATER NOT LIABLE FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT IN PARKING LOT, ASSAULT WAS...
,

THEATER NOT LIABLE FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT IN PARKING LOT, ASSAULT WAS SUDDEN AND WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant movie theater's (Regal's) motion for summary judgment in this parking lot assault case should have been granted. The third-party assault by Casallas-Gonzalez was sudden and was not foreseeable:

A landlord is under a duty to take minimal precautions to protect its tenants and invitees from foreseeable harm, “including the harm caused by a third party's foreseeable criminal conduct on the premises”… . “To establish that criminal acts were foreseeable, the criminal conduct at issue must be shown to be reasonably predictable based on the prior occurrence of the same or similar criminal activity at a location sufficiently proximate to the subject location” … . Knowledge of ambient neighborhood crime, standing alone, is insufficient to establish foreseeability … .

Here, Regal established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law through the submission of evidence demonstrating that the physical altercation between the injured plaintiff and Casallas-Gonzalez was a sudden and unforeseeable event that could not have been anticipated or prevented by the provision of greater security measures … . Regal also established prima facie that the alleged criminal acts committed by Casallas-Gonzalez were not reasonably predictable … . Muzafarov v Casallas-Gonzalez, 2018 NY Slip Op 05771, Second Dept 8-15-18

NEGLIGENCE (THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, THEATER NOT LIABLE FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT IN PARKING LOT, ASSAULT WAS SUDDEN AND WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))/ASSAULT (LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, THEATER NOT LIABLE FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT IN PARKING LOT, ASSAULT WAS SUDDEN AND WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (ASSAULT, LIABILITY FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT, THEATER NOT LIABLE FOR THIRD PARTY ASSAULT IN PARKING LOT, ASSAULT WAS SUDDEN AND WAS NOT FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
PETITIONER WAS 14 IN 1990 WHEN HE MURDERED A CLASSMATE AND THE CHILD SHE WAS BABYSITTING, THE PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY DENIED PAROLE FOR THE FIFTH TIME, THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE BOARD CONSIDERED ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS AND DID NOT BASE THEIR DECISION SOLELY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE (SECOND DEPT).
THE COUNTY WHERE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT OWNED A SEASONAL SECOND HOME (WHERE DEFENDANT LIVED AFTER COVID REACHED NEW YORK CITY) WAS NOT THE PROPER VENUE FOR THE DIVORCE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
CHAIN ACROSS DRIVEWAY WAS NOT “OPEN AND OBVIOUS” AS A MATTER OF LAW; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
Hearsay, Although Admissible, Will Not Alone Raise a Triable Issue of Fact/A “Contractor” (Within the Meaning of Labor Law 240 (1)) Need Only Have the Authority to Control the Work—It Need Not Actually Exercise that Authority
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW 370 DID NOT EXEMPT COUNTY FROM PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE FOR PERSONS DRIVING COUNTY CARS (SECOND DEPT). ​
A MONETARY PENALTY IMPOSED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY, AS OPPOSED TO DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT, WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY (SECOND DEPT).
PROOF OF GENERAL CLEANING PRACTICES NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF NOTICE OF THE WET AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
DEFECT WHICH CAUSED SLIP AND FALL WAS TRIVIAL AS A MATTER OF LAW 2ND DEPT.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED A FORECLOSURE COMPLAINT AND SHOULD... ACTIONS AGAINST THE COUNTY STEMMING FROM PLAINTIFF’S EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS...