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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict in this rear-end collision case were properly denied.  Plaintiff was stopped when the rear-end collision occurred. However, defendant demonstrated that he was unable to stop because of slippery conditions:

On his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by demonstrating that his vehicle was stopped when it was struck in the rear by the defendant’s vehicle… . However, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact as to the existence of a nonnegligent explanation; namely, an unavoidable skidding on a snow-covered road … . …

A motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401 or 4404 may be granted only when the trial court determines that, upon the evidence presented, there is no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational persons to the conclusion reached by the jury upon the evidence presented at trial, and no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party … .

Here, in light of the defendant’s testimony regarding his speed and distance from the plaintiff’s vehicle just before the collision and the testimony that he immediately applied the brakes when the plaintiff’s brake lights illuminated but nonetheless was caused to skid by snowy road conditions, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could reach the conclusion that the defendant was not at fault in the happening of the accident … . Miller v Steinberg, 2018 NY Slip Op 05585, Second Dept 8-1-18

NEGLIGENCE (REAR END COLLISIONS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS  (REAR END COLLISIONS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/REAR END COLLISIONS (PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (REAR END COLLISIONS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFENSE VERDICT IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

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