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HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND, EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENT NOT RAISED BELOW OR ON APPEAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a dissent, affirmed defendant’s conviction for possession of a weapon. In a comprehensive decision too detailed to fairly summarize here the court ruled: the stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger was justified by traffic infractions; the officer’s noticing pictures of firearms on defendant’s phone and the butt of a handgun on defendant’s hip justified asking defendant to step out of the car; defendant’s statement as he got out of the car that he had a handgun on him was admissible; defendant was not entitled to put in evidence his prior statements about his intent to turn the weapon in at the police station; pictures of handguns from defendant’s phone that did not relate to the handgun which was the subject of the possession charge should not have been admitted (harmless error); and defense counsel should have been allowed to cross-examine one of the arresting officers about a federal civil rights suit which had been settled which alleged misconduct with regard to an arrest (harmless error). The court rejected the arguments that the prior statements about turning the handgun in should have been admitted as prior consistent statements or under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule:

… [A]s an essential part of its case-in-chief, the prosecution elicited, through the testimony of a police officer, the defendant’s statement regarding his intent to surrender the gun. As was his right, the defendant elected not to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination, instead relying upon the officer’s testimony to establish his defense of temporary lawful possession of the weapon. Having so elected, he foreclosed any possibility that the prosecutor would cross-examine him and challenge his defense as a recent fabrication during such questioning. Thus, since the requisite claim of a recent fabrication was absent, the defendant could not adduce evidence of a prior consistent statement to rebut it … . * * *

… [O]our dissenting colleague instead primarily argues that [the] proffered testimony regarding the defendant’s alleged statement to her of his intention to surrender the gun should have been admitted as evidence of the defendant’s state of mind rather than for the truth of its contents, thereby obviating any hearsay objection. However, the defendant never advanced this “state of mind” argument at the trial level, nor does he currently contend on this appeal that his purported statement to Armstrong should have been admitted as evidence of his state of mind. Accordingly, this issue is both unpreserved for appellate review … and not before this Court for consideration on the present appeal … . People v Watson, 2018 NY Slip Op 05342, Second Dept 7-18-18

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND, EVIDENTIARY ARGUMENT NOT RAISED BELOW OR ON APPEAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT))/PRIOR CRIMES  (EVIDENCE, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/MOLINEUX HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (CROSS-EXAMINATION, HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENT HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/STATE OF MIND (HEARSAY, , HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))/HEARSAY (HARMLESS ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMES, HARMLESS ERROR TO PROHIBIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ARRESTING OFFICER ABOUT A SETTLED FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS SUIT, STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT NOT ADMISSIBLE AS PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS OR AS EVIDENCE OF STATE OF MIND (SECOND DEPT))

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