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PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to return of his deposit in this real estate transaction. The contract allowed the return of the deposit if plaintiff did not qualify for a mortgage within a specified period of time. Plaintiff did qualify within the allowed time. However, he subsequently lost his job and could not obtain the mortgage. Plaintiff asked for the deposit but defendant refused:

” A mortgage contingency clause is construed to create a condition precedent to the contract of sale'” … . “The purchaser is entitled to return of the down payment where the mortgage contingency clause unequivocally provides for its return upon the purchaser’s inability to obtain a mortgage commitment within the contingency period”… . “However, when the lender revokes the mortgage commitment after the contingency period has elapsed, the contractual provision relating to failure to obtain an initial commitment is inoperable, and the question becomes whether the lender’s revocation was attributable to any bad faith on the part of the purchaser”… .

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law for the return of his down payment. He submitted evidence that he acted in good faith in obtaining a mortgage commitment, that the commitment was subject to re-verification of employment, and that the subsequent revocation of the commitment was not attributable to any bad faith on his part … . Chahalis v Roberta Ebert Irrevocable Trust, 2018 NY Slip Op 05135, Second Dept 7-11-18

REAL ESTATE (PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT))/DEPOSIT (REAL ESTATE, PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT))/MORTGAGE COMMITMENT (REAL ESTATE, PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT))

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