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COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined Supreme Court exceeded its authority when it vacated an arbitration award and the court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the police officer (Lee) seeking Municipal Law 207-c benefits in another arbitration proceeding handled by a union lawyer:

Lee established that the court failed to acquire personal jurisdiction over her in the proceeding to confirm the arbitration award … because the City never properly served her … . Nor did the court acquire personal jurisdiction over Lee by the unauthorized appearance of the Union’s attorney “on behalf of Katherine Lee.” Contrary to the City’s contention, there is no evidence that Lee expressly or implicitly authorized the Union’s attorney to represent her at any stage of the proceedings. …

We further conclude that the court erred in sua sponte vacating its prior order and judgment, which confirmed the arbitration award … , and directing further arbitration. … A court has authority to “vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” … . That authority, however, is not unlimited… . “A court’s inherent power to exercise control over its judgments is not plenary, and should be resorted to only to relieve a party from judgments taken through [fraud,] mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” … .

In vacating the order and judgment, … the court “exceeded the narrow bounds within which courts are authorized to alter [arbitration] awards” … . None of the bases in CPLR 7511 (b) or (c) for vacating or modifying an arbitration award applies to the arbitrator’s failure to award the City a specific dollar amount for the value of benefits received by Lee, and the court had no power to disturb the award apart from the grounds set forth in those subdivisions  … . Matter of City of Syracuse (Lee), 2018 NY Slip Op 05077, Third Dept 7-6-18

​ARBITRATION (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (MUNICIPAL LAW, COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARBITRATION,  COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY WHEN IT VACATED AN ARBITRATION AWARD, COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A POLICE OFFICER SEEKING MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c BENEFITS BECAUSE THE OFFICER NEVER AUTHORIZED THE UNION ATTORNEY TO REPRESENT HER (FOURTH DEPT))

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