You are here: / / COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY...
,

COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the court attorney referee was not authorized to determine a contested family offense petition or custody and visitation issues:

A referee derives authority from an order of reference by the court (see CPLR 4311, 4317…). Here, as correctly asserted by the mother, the order of reference did not authorize the Court Attorney Referee to hear and report or to hear and determine a contested family offense petition. The Court Attorney Referee therefore lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the mother’s family offense petition in this instance… . Accordingly, the family offense matter must be remitted to a judge of the Family Court for a new determination.

With respect to the determination of custody, the order of reference recited that, upon the parties’ stipulation, a court attorney referee is authorized to hear and determine the parties’ rights to custody of and visitation with the child, including the determination of motions and temporary orders of custody. Upon our review of the record, however, we find no indication that the parties stipulated to the reference in the manner prescribed by CPLR 2104, and, absent such stipulation, the Court Attorney Referee had the power only to hear and report her findings … . We further find that the mother did not consent to the reference merely by participating in the proceeding without expressing her desire to have the matter tried before a judge … . The order of reference must therefore be deemed an order to hear and report. Thus, the Court Attorney Referee had no jurisdiction to determine, but only to hear and report, with respect to the parties’ respective rights of custody and visitation … . Matter of Rose v Simon, 2018 NY Slip Op 04736, Second Dept 6-27-18

​FAMILY LAW (COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FAMILY LAW, COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 4311, 4317, 2104 (FAMILY LAW, COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE (FAMILY LAW, COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))/REFEREES  (FAMILY LAW, COURT ATTORNEY REFEREE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE A CONTESTED FAMILY OFFENSE PETITION OR CUSTODY AND VISITATION ISSUES (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
OWNER OF OWNER-OCCUPIED TWO-FAMILY RESIDENCE IS EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY FOR A SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL PURSUANT TO THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE AND WAS NOT LIABLE UNDER THE COMMON LAW; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Testimony Insufficient to Overcome Presumption Photo Arrays, Which Were Not Preserved, Were Unduly Suggestive—Subsequent Line-Up, Which Included Persons Much Older than Defendant, Was Unduly Suggestive—New Trial Ordered
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED BY A DRIVER WHO WAS BEING PURSUED BY THE POLICE; THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTERNAL RULES IMPOSED A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE FOR POLICE-CHASES THAN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THE INTERNAL RULES COULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY AS SOME EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE; PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
UNION’S CLAIM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR LINE OF DUTY INJURIES WAS BEING UNDULY DELAYED OR DENIED WAS ARBITRABLE, WHETHER THE UNDERLYING GRIEVANCE WAS TIMELY BROUGHT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE ARBITRATOR, NOT THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, NO NEED TO DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE EXCUSE; THE LOAN AGREEMENT WAS CRIMINALLY USURIOUS; THE MOTION TO DISIMISS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Petitioner Entitled to Homestead Exemption During Period Prior to the Contract of Sale for Her Home
INSUFFICIENT PROOF SIGNATURE ON A POWER OF ATTORNEY WAS FORGED, SUPREME COURT REVERSED.
A PROPER FOUNDATION WAS NOT LAID FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS RELIED UPON BY THE PLAINTIFF; THEREFORE THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE WERE NOT MET AND PLAINTIFF’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF WALKED INTO THE REAR OF A TRACTOR TRAILER WHICH WAS MAKING A RIGHT... FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE TO COUNSEL OF THE CONTENTS OF JURY NOTES AND FAILURE...