You are here: / / CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY...

CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department vacated defendant’s conviction of attempted assault in the second degree, noting that the crime is a legal impossibility:

The crime of attempted assault in the second degree is a legal impossibility (see Penal Law § 120.05[3]; People v Campbell, 72 NY2d 602, 605…). As correctly conceded by the People, the inclusion of that nonexistent crime in the superior court information constituted a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect, necessitating vacatur of the defendant’s conviction of attempted assault in the second degree, vacatur of the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissal of that count of the superior court information … . People v Jones, 2018 NY Slip Op 04565, Second Dept 6-20-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY (SECOND DEPT))/ASSAULT (CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY (SECOND DEPT))/ATTEMPTED ASSAULT  (CRIME OF ATTEMPTED ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE IS A LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, INSTEAD THE APPLICATION WAS DISMISSED AS ‘PREMATURE,’ MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Accountant’s Liability to Third Parties in Absence of Contractual Relationship Explained
“Cleaning” Within the Meaning of Labor Law 240(1) Explained
THE CONVICTION WAS AFFIRMED BUT A STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT ARGUED EXCESSIVE INTERVENTION BY THE JUDGE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PETITION JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE, PETITION ALLEGING UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
ATTORNEY WHO HIRED AN ASSOCIATE WHO PREVIOUSLY WORKED AS A PARALEGAL AT THE FIRM REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH PLAINTIFF DID NOT TIMELY FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE AND DID NOT COMPLY WITH A PRIOR DISCOVERY ORDER, THE JUDGE WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO, SUA SPONTE, DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF HAD NOT BEEN SERVED WITH A VAILD 90-DAY DEMAND TO FILE A NOTE OF ISSUE (SECOND DEPT).
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH BY THE BANK; THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF INJURED WHEN LAWN CHAIR SANK INTO A HOLE CONCEALED BY GRASS, QUESTION... THERE WAS GOOD CAUSE FOR THE 31 YEAR DELAY IN INDICTING DEFENDANT FOR MURDER...