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ALTHOUGH THE INSURER COULD DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INSURED ASSAILANT’S INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE INSURER COULD NOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT INJURIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE ASSAILANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff insurer could not completely disclaim coverage of injuries suffered by the defendant at the insured home (owned by the McCabe’s). McCabe was convicted of assaulting and strangling the defendant. Defendant alleges that after McCabe assaulted her she fell over a tripping hazard in the McCabe home and was injured in the fall. Although the insurer can properly disclaim coverage for any injuries inflicted by McCabe’s intentional criminal conduct under the collateral estoppel doctrine, the insurer could not, at this early stage, disclaim coverage for any injuries that might have been caused by McCabe’s negligence (tripping hazard, failure to seek medical care, etc.):

Plaintiff asserts that, to convict McCabe, the criminal jury must have disbelieved his version of events. It is possible, however, that the jury disbelieved only some portions of his testimony … . The jury may have found it incredible that all of defendant’s facial and head injuries were caused when she tried to walk on her own, fell over a raised threshold in the doorway and hit her head on a cinder block wall during that fall. It is also possible that the jury believed that McCabe slammed defendant’s head into the ground or a wall, thereby causing some of her injuries, but the jury did not render any findings regarding what happened after the choking and slamming, such as whether defendant then got up, tried to walk and fell. To establish the convictions, it was unnecessary for the jury to have made findings regarding whether McCabe created a tripping hazard, allowed defendant to walk on her own after he had rendered her partially incapacitated or failed to seek medical help for her after the criminal assault. Hence, the issues as to insurance coverage and exclusions are not identical to the issues decided in McCabe’s criminal trial, and defendants here did not have a full and fair opportunity in the criminal trial to address some of the issues regarding McCabe’s negligence allegedly committed before and after the criminal assault. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was no possible factual or legal basis to support a finding that some of defendant’s injuries were unintended by McCabe, so as to bar coverage under the policy exclusion … . Accordingly, collateral estoppel does not apply here, except as to the more narrow issues necessarily decided in the criminal trial, and plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment or a declaratory judgment at this early stage of this coverage action … . State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Chauncey McCabe, 2018 NY Slip Op 04416, Third Dept 6-14-18

​INSURANCE LAW (ALTHOUGH THE INSURER COULD DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INSURED ASSAILANT’S INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE INSURER COULD NOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT INJURIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE ASSAILANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INSURANCE LAW, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, ALTHOUGH THE INSURER COULD DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INSURED ASSAILANT’S INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE INSURER COULD NOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT INJURIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE ASSAILANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT))/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (INSURANCE LAW, ALTHOUGH THE INSURER COULD DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INSURED ASSAILANT’S INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE INSURER COULD NOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT INJURIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE ASSAILANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT))/CRIMINAL LAW (INSURANCE LAW, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, ALTHOUGH THE INSURER COULD DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INSURED ASSAILANT’S INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE INSURER COULD NOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT INJURIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE ASSAILANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (INSURANCE LAW, CRIMINAL LAW, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, ALTHOUGH THE INSURER COULD DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY INJURIES CAUSED BY THE INSURED ASSAILANT’S INTENTIONAL CRIMINAL ACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL, THE INSURER COULD NOT DISCLAIM COVERAGE FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT INJURIES THAT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE ASSAILANT’S NEGLIGENCE (THIRD DEPT))

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