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BAD FAITH DISCLAIMER ACTION BROUGHT AFTER INJURED PLAINTIFFS WERE ASSIGNED THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE BAD FAITH ACTION UNTIL THE RIGHTS WERE ASSIGNED (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department determined plaintiffs’ bad faith action against the insurer was not barred by res judicata. Plaintiffs successfully sued the insured in this accidental shooting case and recovered the policy limits. Plaintiffs then were assigned the insured’s rights against the insurer and sued for the insurer for disclaiming coverage in bad faith. Because plaintiffs could not have brought the bad faith action until the assignment of rights, plaintiffs had standing to bring the current action. The Fourth Department noted that the 1st Department had come to the opposite conclusion under similar facts:

… [U]nder Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) and (b) (1), an injured party’s standing to bring an action against an insurer is limited to recovering only the policy limits of the insured’s insurance policy. … [I]f an injured party/judgment creditor seeks to recover from the insurer an amount above the insured’s policy limits on a theory of liability beyond that created by Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2), the statute does not confer standing to do so. However, if the insured assigns his or her rights under the insurance contract to the injured party/judgment creditor, then the injured party/judgment creditor may simultaneously bring a direct action against the insurer pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) along with any other appropriate claim, including a bad faith claim, seeking a judgment in a total amount beyond the insured’s policy limits.

Here, when [plaintiffs] commenced the prior action pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) … , the [insured] had not yet assigned their rights under the insurance contract … . As a result, [plaintiffs] did not have standing to bring a bad faith claim against defendant … . Thus, because [plaintiffs] lacked standing to bring a bad faith claim against defendant at the time [they] brought the Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) action, we conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar this action … . Corle v Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 04135, Fourth Dept 6-8-18​

INSURANCE LAW (BAD FAITH DISCLAIMER ACTION BROUGHT AFTER INJURED PLAINTIFFS WERE ASSIGNED THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE BAD FAITH ACTION UNTIL THE RIGHTS WERE ASSIGNED (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (RES JUDICATA, INSURANCE LAW, BAD FAITH DISCLAIMER ACTION BROUGHT AFTER INJURED PLAINTIFFS WERE ASSIGNED THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE BAD FAITH ACTION UNTIL THE RIGHTS WERE ASSIGNED (FOURTH DEPT))/BAD FAITH (INSURANCE LAW, (BAD FAITH DISCLAIMER ACTION BROUGHT AFTER INJURED PLAINTIFFS WERE ASSIGNED THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE BAD FAITH ACTION UNTIL THE RIGHTS WERE ASSIGNED (FOURTH DEPT))/DISCLAIMER (INSURANCE LAW, BAD FAITH DISCLAIMER ACTION BROUGHT AFTER INJURED PLAINTIFFS WERE ASSIGNED THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE BAD FAITH ACTION UNTIL THE RIGHTS WERE ASSIGNED (FOURTH DEPT))/RES JUDICATA (INSURANCE LAW, BAD FAITH DISCLAIMER ACTION BROUGHT AFTER INJURED PLAINTIFFS WERE ASSIGNED THE INSURED’S RIGHTS UNDER THE POLICY NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE BAD FAITH ACTION UNTIL THE RIGHTS WERE ASSIGNED (FOURTH DEPT))

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