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DURATION OF ORDERS OF PROTECTION FOR A BIOLOGICAL GRANDFATHER AND A STEPGRANDFATHER EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department discussed the allowed duration of orders of protection for a biological grandfather and a stepgrandfather:

Family Ct Act § 1056 (4) provides that “[t]he court may enter an order of protection[,] independently of any other order made under this part, against a person who was a member of the child’s household or a person legally responsible . . . and who is no longer a member of such household at the time of the disposition and who is not related by blood or marriage to the child or a member of the child’s household. [Such] order of protection . . . may be for any period of time up to the child’s eighteenth birthday.” Because Harold J. is the biological grandfather of Annabella and Caleb J., the orders of protection as to these children must be modified to reflect an expiration date … one year from disposition of the matter … .​

The familial relationship between Makayla and Harold J. warrants slightly more analysis as Harold J. is not Makayla’s biological grandfather, but rather is related to her through his son’s marriage to Makayla’s mother. This raises the issue of whether a stepgrandparent is related to a stepgrandchild by marriage for the purposes of Family Ct Act § 1056 (4). We conclude that they are not. This conclusion is supported by the specific language in the statute, “related by . . . marriage” … , rather than the broader and more inclusive concept of “affinity,” which is used elsewhere in the Family Ct Act … . Further, a stepgrandparent has no enforceable legal right to have contact with a stepgrandchild as a stepgrandparent lacks standing to pursue visitation … . Thus, although Family Ct Act § 1056 (4) limits the duration of orders of protection against a stepparent who is related to a child by and through his or her own marriage to the child’s mother or father, these limitations do not apply to a stepgrandparent, whose relationship to the child is attenuated. Therefore, because Harold J.’s relationship to Makayla is not established by his own marriage, but rather through his son’s marriage, it was statutorily permissible, in this regard, for Family Court to issue an order of protection until Makayla’s eighteenth birthday. Our analysis does not end here, however, as Family Ct Act § 1056 (4) prohibits orders of protection until a child’s eighteenth birthday if the order is against someone who is related by blood or marriage to a member of the child’s household. Therefore, if, at the time of disposition, Makayla resided in the same household as Annabella and Caleb J., the order of protection as to Makayla could not exceed one year … . Inasmuch as we cannot discern from the record whether this is the case, the matter must be remitted for the purpose of making this determination. Matter of Makayla I. (Caleb K.), 2018 NY Slip Op 04047, Third Dept 6-7-18

FAMILY LAW (ORDERS OF PROTECTION, DURATION OF ORDERS OF PROTECTION FOR A BIOLOGICAL GRANDFATHER AND A STEPGRANDFATHER EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/ORDERS OF PROTECTION (FAMILY LAW, DURATION OF ORDERS OF PROTECTION FOR A BIOLOGICAL GRANDFATHER AND A STEPGRANDFATHER EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))

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