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DATE OF LOSS DEEMED TO BE DATE THE CLAIM FOR A STOLEN CAR WAS DENIED, NOT THE DATE THE CAR WAS STOLEN (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the term “date of loss” in the policy referred to the date the insurer disclaimed coverage, not the date the car was stolen. Therefore plaintiff’s action for breach of contract was timely. The contract properly shortened the applicable statute of limitations to one year:

In our view, the generic “date of loss” language employed here, in the context of the policy as a whole, does not evince an unmistakable intention that the one-year limitations period be measured from the occurrence of the underlying event … . Significantly, in shortening the limitations period, the insurance policy did not use the term of art “inception of loss” or other similarly specific language indicating that the limitations period was to be measured from the event giving rise to the claim … . Moreover, although “date of loss” could be reasonably interpreted to mean the date of theft, as defendant contends, ambiguities in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer … . In view of the foregoing, we hold that the one-year limitations period set forth in the insurance policy began to run on the date that defendant denied the claim for coverage … . Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC v Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 04064, Third Dept 6-7-18

INSURANCE LAW (DATE OF LOSS DEEMED TO BE DATE THE CLAIM FOR A STOLEN CAR WAS DENIED, NOT THE DATE THE CAR WAS STOLEN (THIRD DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, DATE OF LOSS DEEMED TO BE DATE THE CLAIM FOR A STOLEN CAR WAS DENIED, NOT THE DATE THE CAR WAS STOLEN (THIRD DEPT))

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