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FALL THOUGH AN UNGUARDED FLOOR OPENING AT A CONSTRUCTION SITE IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ABLE TO TIE OFF HIS HARNESS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, noted that, although the fall through an unguarded floor opening at a construction site was covered under Labor Law 240 (1), there was a question of fact whether plaintiff was able to tie off his harness. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment shouldn’t have been granted:

“[A] fall through an unguarded opening in the floor of a construction site constitutes a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) only where a safety device adequate to prevent such a fall was not provided. A safety line and harness may be an adequate safety device for a person working over an open area or near an elevated edge” … . Here, the record demonstrates that although plaintiff was wearing a harness and lanyard at the time of the accident, triable issues exist as to whether static lines were in place for him to safely tie off. Maman v Marx Realty & Improvement Co., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 03614, First Dept 5-17-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (FALL THOUGH AN UNGUARDED FLOOR OPENING AT A CONSTRUCTION SITE IS COVERED UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1), THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS ABLE TO TIE OFF HIS HARNESS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION.
PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE INJURY WAS CAUSED BY THE ACCIDENT, AS OPPOSED TO A DEGENERATIVE DISEASE; TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT.
THE FIRST EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT INCLUDED A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, THE SECOND AGREEMENT REQUIRED ARBITRATION, THE SECOND AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED THE FIRST (FIRST DEPT).
COUNSEL’S CONDUCT WAS NOT FRIVILOUS OR DESIGNED TO DELAY; COUNSEL WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BEFORE SANCTIONED; THE JUDGE DID NOT INDICATE WHY THE AMOUNT OF THE SANCTION WAS APPROPRIATE, $100 SANCTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT). ​
THE NYC HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION (HRA) WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY OF THE PROCEEDS OF PLAINTIFF’S CAR-ACCIDENT SETTLEMENT BECAUSE THE SETTLEMENT DID NOT INCLUDE MEDICAL EXPENSES; PLAINTIFF WAS BARRED FROM RECOVERY OF MEDICAL COSTS BECAUSE HER BASIC ECONOMIC LOSS WAS LESS THAN $50,000 (INS LAW 5102) (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM LEVEL TWO TO LEVEL ONE IN THIS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASE (FIRST DEPT).
Deliberate Avoidance of Service of Process 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF INHALED ENOUGH ASBESTOS TO CAUSE HIS CANCER WAS THE SUBJECT OF COMPETING SIMULATION STUDIES; PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

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