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PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY QUALIFYING HER FOR MEDICAID-REIMBURSED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, CONTRARY FINDING BY THE NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ANNULLED (FIRST DEPT).

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The First Department, annulling the determination of the NYS Office for People with Developmental Disabilities, held that the petitioner demonstrated an intellectual disability qualifying her for Medicaid-reimbursed home and community based services:

In order to obtain Medicaid-reimbursed home and community based services, an applicant must demonstrate that he or she suffers from a “developmental disability.” An “intellectual disability” that originated before age 22, is expected to continue indefinitely, and constitutes a “substantial handicap” to the person’s ability to function normally in society, is a qualifying condition (Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03[22] [a][1], [b], [c] and [d]). The American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed 2013) (Manual) defines “intellectual disability” as a disorder characterized by, inter alia, (1) general deficits in areas such as reasoning, problem solving and abstract thinking and (2) deficits in adaptive functioning, such as how well the person meets community standards of personal independence and social responsibility as compared to others of similar age and social responsibility. The term “intellectual disability” replaced the term “mental retardation.”

Here, respondent’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence … . Rather, the record demonstrates that petitioner met the qualifications as all of the evaluations that were performed before petitioner was 22 years old demonstrated an I.Q. below 70, which was the rough cut off for normal intellectual function. Deficits in her adaptive functioning were also noted repeatedly over the years. Moreover, it was entirely speculative to opine that petitioner’s I.Q. would have been higher but for co-occurring conditions. Matter of Spencer-Cedeno v Zucker, 2018 NY Slip Op 03488, First Dept 5-15-18

​MEDICAID (INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY QUALIFYING HER FOR MEDICAID REIMBURSED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, CONTRARY FINDING BY THE NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ANNULLED (FIRST DEPT))/MENTAL HYGIENE LAW  (INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY QUALIFYING HER FOR MEDICAID REIMBURSED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, CONTRARY FINDING BY THE NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ANNULLED (FIRST DEPT))/INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY (MEDICAID, PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY QUALIFYING HER FOR MEDICAID REIMBURSED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, CONTRARY FINDING BY THE NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ANNULLED (FIRST DEPT))/DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, MEDICAID, PETITIONER DEMONSTRATED AN INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY QUALIFYING HER FOR MEDICAID REIMBURSED HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES, CONTRARY FINDING BY THE NYS OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ANNULLED (FIRST DEPT))

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