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PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioner, a private residential school for children with intellectual and developmental disabilities (Center for Discovery), had exhausted its administrative remedies in seeking reimbursement from the NYC Department of Education for providing 24-hour care for a student with autism (pursuant to an Individualized Education Plan or IEP). The matter was therefore sent back to Supreme Court. The First Department noted that, although estoppel is usually not available in an action against a governmental agency, it may be appropriate here based upon the respondent’s alleged promise to reimburse petitioner and petitioner’s reliance on that promise:

… [W]e disagree that the doctrine of “exhaustion of remedies” precludes review of this case… .

A “final and binding” determination is one where the agency “reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury,” and the injury may not be “significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party” … .

Respondent reached a definitive position concerning reimbursement for the additional services mandated by the amended IEP that inflicted concrete injury on petitioner. Counsel’s … email clearly stated that the City would not be reimbursing petitioner for the additional services mandated by the amended IEP. Petitioner had no available means of seeking review of respondent’s decision from respondent or any other City or State agency empowered to review, overturn, or reverse the City’s determination concerning reimbursement for the services explicitly mandated by the City in the amended IEP. The email was thus the “final” determination of respondent City on the issue … . …

Petitioner … alleges that it relied on respondent’s representation that it would be reimbursed for the additional services mandated and provided under the amended IEP. While estoppel is generally not available in an action against a government agency, this case presents a factual dispute as to the applicability of the doctrine that must be determined upon remand … . Matter of Center for Discovery, Inc. v NYC Dept. of Educ., 2018 NY Slip Op 03494, First Dept 5-15-18

​EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES, PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT))/ESTOPPEL (MUNICIPAL LAW, PETITIONER, A PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED CHILDREN, HAD EXHAUSTED ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN SEEKING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION FOR 24-HOUR CARE FOR A STUDENT WITH AUTISM, MATTER REMITTED WITH INSTRUCTION THAT THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON A PROMISE TO REIMBURSE, MAY APPLY (FIRST DEPT))

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