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ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PURELY VICARIOUS, ATTORNEYS FOR BOTH THE HOSPITAL AND THE EMPLOYEE-PHYSICIAN WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the trial court in this medical malpractice action did not err in allowing the continued participation of the attorney for defendant hospital (AMH) after the action against the hospital had been dismissed. After the dismissal of the action against the hospital, the only liability the hospital faced was vicarious liability for the actions of its physician employee, who was represented by another attorney. The Third Department further found that the plaintiffs’ request, made for the first time at trial, to call an expert to establish, by cell phone and tower information (GIS), the location of a physician who had been called to assist at the hospital was properly denied:

Following the dismissal of all claims of direct negligence asserted against AMH, plaintiffs renewed their motion to have the role of AMH’s counsel limited. While the dismissal of the direct negligence claims rendered AMH’s potential liability purely vicarious in nature, we are unable to conclude that Supreme Court’s refusal to limit the role of AMH’s counsel during the remainder of the trial to essentially that of a spectator was in error. Because AMH’s liability would be determined by the jury’s findings in relation to plaintiffs’ claims of negligence against Olsen [its physician-employee], AMH was entitled to participate in the efforts to defeat those claims … . Supreme Court promised to exert control over the cross-examination of the remaining witnesses by AMH’s counsel, indicating its intent to prevent any attempt by AMH to “reiterate or to plow ground that has already been plowed by one side or the other,” and the record reflects that counsel’s cross-examination of these witnesses, if any, was limited and dealt primarily with different material than that explored on direct examination. The balanced approach taken by the court served to ensure defendants’ valued right to representation by counsel of their choosing while also protecting plaintiffs against the possibility of unduly cumulative and duplicative proof … . Under these circumstances, we find no “clear abuse of discretion” in the course of action taken by Supreme Court nor any prejudice to plaintiffs as a result thereof … . * * *

… [P]laintiffs first notified defendants of their intention to call a GIS expert more than three years after defendants’ respective demands for expert disclosure and during the midst of the trial. Notably, [the physcian’s] cell phone number was provided to plaintiffs during a pretrial deposition more than a year and a half earlier and, thus, plaintiffs possessed the essential facts necessary to investigate the matter — and, if necessary, to retain an expert — long before trial. Plaintiffs’ claim that they did not realize the significance of the calls, and thus the need to subpoena the phone records, until shortly before trial did not, as Supreme Court found, constitute good cause for the delay … . Moreover, we agree with Supreme Court that, given the complex and technical issues presented by the proposed GIS testimony, the mid-trial disclosure of this expert would have prejudiced defendants … . Lasher v Albany Mem. Hosp., 2018 NY Slip Op 03402, Third Dept 5-10-18

​ATTORNEYS (ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PURELY VICARIOUS ATTORNEYS FOR BOTH THE HOSPITAL AND THE EMPLOYEE-PHYSICIAN WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ATTORNEYS, TRIAL, ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PURELY VICARIOUS ATTORNEYS FOR BOTH THE HOSPITAL AND THE EMPLOYEE-PHYSICIAN WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (EXPERT WITNESSES, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (ATTORNEYS, TRIAL, ALTHOUGH THE HOSPITAL’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS PURELY VICARIOUS ATTORNEYS FOR BOTH THE HOSPITAL AND THE EMPLOYEE-PHYSICIAN WERE PROPERLY ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TRIAL, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/CPLR 3101 (EXPERT WITNESSES, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))/EXPERT WITNESSES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOTICE, PLAINTIFFS’ MID-TRIAL REQUEST TO CALL AN EXPERT WITNESS PROPERLY DENIED (THIRD DEPT))

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