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DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD BASED ON SEVERAL TYPES OF SEXUAL TOUCHING, BUT NOT KISSING, THE JURY WAS ALLOWED TO CONSIDER KISSING, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child based upon a theory that was not charged in the indictment. The endangering count of the indictment alleged defendant had subjected the victim to several types of sexual touching, but not kissing. The jury was allowed to consider the evidence of kissing. The defendant was acquitted of all counts except the endangering count:

In summation, the People argued, over objection, that the defendant’s guilt of endangering the welfare of a child was established by the conduct of kissing the complainant. The Supreme Court then instructed the jury, over objection, that in order to find the defendant guilty of endangering the welfare of a child under the relevant count, the jurors were required to find that the defendant knowingly acted in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or moral welfare of the complainant, a child less than 17 years old, by engaging in sexual contact with her, defined, under the general definition in the Penal Law, as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party” … . The jury returned a verdict of guilty on that count, and acquitted the defendant of the other counts submitted to it, which charged the defendant, inter alia, with engaging in vaginal and anal intercourse with the complainant.

Where the prosecution is limited by the indictment or bill of particulars to a certain theory or theories, the court must hold the prosecution to such narrower theory or theories … . Here, the defendant was convicted of endangering the welfare of a child under a count of the indictment that limited the People to a particular theory or theories of endangering the welfare of a child. Therefore, the Supreme Court erred when it permitted the jury to consider a theory not charged in the indictment—that kissing endangered the complainant’s welfare … . Since the defendant’s conviction may have been based upon an uncharged theory, the judgment of conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. People v Vasquez, 2018 NY Slip Op 03382, Second Dept 5-9-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (INDICTMENTS, EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD BASED ON SEVERAL TYPES OF SEXUAL TOUCHING, BUT NOT KISSING, THE JURY WAS ALLOWED TO CONSIDER KISSING, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/INDICTMENTS (EVIDENCE, DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD BASED ON SEVERAL TYPES OF SEXUAL TOUCHING, BUT NOT KISSING, THE JURY WAS ALLOWED TO CONSIDER KISSING, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, INDICTMENTS, DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD BASED ON SEVERAL TYPES OF SEXUAL TOUCHING, BUT NOT KISSING, THE JURY WAS ALLOWED TO CONSIDER KISSING, CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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ALTHOUGH THE MANSLAUGHTER AND NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS WHERE SUPPORTED... TWO STATEMENTS FOUND TO BE NONACTIONABLE EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION IN THIS DEFAMATION...