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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) HAS THE POWER TO UNILATERALLY UNDERTAKE THE REMEDIATION OF A HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CORPORATION WHICH RELEASED THE WASTE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) had the power to unilaterally undertake the remediation of a hazardous waste site, without the participation of the corporation (FMC) which released the waste. The fact that FMC had been operating under an interim permit (for 38 years) did not insulate FMC from the consequences of violating the permit.

The only reasonable interpretation consistent with the statutory scheme and legislative purpose is that permittees and prospective permittees who exceed the terms of their permit or violate the performance standards required of those operating under interim status violate [Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) section 27—0914. * * *

,,, [T]itle 13 [of the ECL] provides an avenue for DEC to use the state superfund to unilaterally remediate the relevant properties … . …[T]hat statute requires DEC, absent exigent circumstances, to have first made “all reasonable efforts to secure voluntary agreement to pay the costs of necessary remedial actions from owners” … . … Here, DEC’s conducting a year of negotiations only to be told that FMC cannot see any mutually-agreed upon path forward is more than the statute requires. The statute’s other requirement—that DEC later make “all reasonable efforts to recover the full amount of any funds expended” … —will be fulfilled in a CERCLA cost recovery action in federal district court. That action will provide FMC with an opportunity for a hearing to dispute its liability, as DEC has repeatedly acknowledged throughout the course of this proceeding. Matter of FMC Corp. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 2018 NY Slip Op 03094, CtApp 5-1-18

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (HAZARDOUS WASTE, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) HAS THE POWER TO UNILATERALLY UNDERTAKE THE REMEDIATION OF A HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CORPORATION WHICH RELEASED THE WASTE (CT APP))/HAZARDOUS WASTE (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) HAS THE POWER TO UNILATERALLY UNDERTAKE THE REMEDIATION OF A HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CORPORATION WHICH RELEASED THE WASTE (CT APP))/REMEDIATION (HAZARDOUS WASTE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,  DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) HAS THE POWER TO UNILATERALLY UNDERTAKE THE REMEDIATION OF A HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE, WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CORPORATION WHICH RELEASED THE WASTE (CT APP))

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