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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SPECTATOR PROTECTION AT A HOCKEY RINK WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PUCK (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined there was a question of fact whether defendant municipality and hockey club were negligent in failing to adequately protect the plaintiff, a spectator, from being struck by a hockey puck, The goals had been repositioned in areas where there was no protective netting behind them:

It is well-settled that an owner or operator of an athletic field or facility “is not an insurer of the safety of its spectators” … and that, under the assumption of risk doctrine, consenting “[s]pectators and bystanders . . . assume risks associated with a sporting event or activity, even at times when they are not actively watching the event” … . However, “a plaintiff will not be deemed to have assumed the risks of reckless or intentional conduct, or concealed or unreasonably increased risks”… . Notwithstanding a spectator’s assumption of risk, an owner or occupier of land remains under a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent injury to those who are present on the property … . In the context of hockey rinks, “the owner’s duty owed to spectators is discharged by providing screening around the area behind the hockey goals, where the danger of being struck by a puck is the greatest, as long as the screening is of sufficient extent to provide adequate protection for as many spectators as may reasonably be expected to desire to view the game from behind such screening” … . …

… [P]laintiffs’ proof demonstrating that defendants’ repositioning of the hockey goals along the less protected sides of the rink — “where the danger of being struck by a puck is greatest” …  — was sufficient to show the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants satisfied their reasonable duty of care owed to the child walking down the ramp behind the repositioned goal. Smero v City of Saratoga Springs, 2018 NY Slip Op 02521, Third Dept 4-12-18

​NEGLIGENCE (HOCKEY RINK, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SPECTATOR PROTECTION AT A HOCKEY RINK WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PUCK (THIRD DEPT))/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (HOCKEY RINK, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SPECTATOR PROTECTION AT A HOCKEY RINK WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PUCK (THIRD DEPT))/SPECTATORS (HOCKEY RINK, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SPECTATOR PROTECTION AT A HOCKEY RINK WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PUCK (THIRD DEPT))/HOCKEY (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SPECTATOR PROTECTION AT A HOCKEY RINK WAS SUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF WAS STRUCK BY A PUCK (THIRD DEPT))

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