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PLAINTIFF, WHO TRIPPED ON AN EXTENSION CORD AND FELL DOWN A STAIRWELL, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. He was working in a stairwell and tripped over an extension cord:

Because the stairway was an elevated surface on which plaintiff was required to work, and also the sole means of access to his work area, it constituted a safety device within the meaning of the statute … , as well as an elevated work platform that required provision of an adequate safety device … . Under either theory, it is clear that plaintiff’s fall was the direct result of absence of an adequate safety device, and thus, plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment on the section 240(1) cause of action. That plaintiff tripped on an extension cord does not take the case out of the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1)… , and the fact that the staircase from which plaintiff fell was a permanent structure of the building does not remove this case from the coverage of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Conlon v Carnegie Hall Socy., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02268, First Dept 3-29-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF, WHO TRIPPED ON AN EXTENSION CORD AND FELL DOWN A STAIRWELL, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))/STAIRS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF, WHO TRIPPED ON AN EXTENSION CORD AND FELL DOWN A STAIRWELL, WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT))

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