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UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY LANGUAGE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INSURED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over an extensive two-judge dissent, determined that the language of the policy which required a written contract with an additional insured (Gilbane JV) was unambiguous and precluded coverage:

The relevant portion of the Liberty policy is the “Additional Insured-By Written Contract” provision, which reads:

“WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured any person or organization with whom you have agreed to add as an additional insured by written contract but only with respect to liability arising out of your operations or premises owned by or rented to you.”… . …

… [T]he endorsement would have the meaning Gilbane JV desires if the word “with” had been omitted. Omitting “with,” the phrase would read: “. . . any person or organization whom you have agreed by written contract to add . . .”, and Gilbane JV’s position would have merit. But [the general contractor] and Liberty included that preposition in the contract between them, and we must give it its ordinary meaning. Here, the “with” can only mean that the written contract must be “with” the additional insured. Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Constr. Corp. v St. Paul Fire & Mar. Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 02117, CtApp 3-27-18

INSURANCE LAW (UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY LANGUAGE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INSURED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE (CT APP))/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE LAW, UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY LANGUAGE REQUIRED A WRITTEN CONTRACT WITH ANY ADDITIONAL INSURED, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO WRITTEN CONTRACT, THERE WAS NO COVERAGE (CT APP))

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