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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OR NORMAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD APPLIES IN THIS POLICE CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined there was a question of fact whether the defendant police officer involved a traffic accident with plaintiff was proceeding through a red light or a green light on his way to an (another) accident scene. If the light was red, the reckless disregard standard would apply to the officer’s driving. If the light was green, the normal negligence standard would apply:

We reject defendants’ contention that the color of the traffic light is not a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment. If the factfinder determines that defendant officer was engaged in the exempt conduct of proceeding past a steady red signal (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [b] [2]), then the reckless disregard standard of care would apply under the circumstances presented herein … . If, however, the factfinder credits defendant officer’s account that he was proceeding through a green light, then the alleged injury-causing conduct by defendant officer would be governed by principles of ordinary negligence… . Inasmuch as the resolution of that factual issue will determine the standard of care by which the factfinder must evaluate defendant officer’s conduct … , we conclude that the court erred in determining on the submissions before it that the reckless disregard standard applies as a matter of law. Furthermore, the determination of the color of the traffic light at the time of the collision, and each driver’s compliance with the standard of care that will apply upon resolution of that material factual issue, depends on the memory and credibility of witnesses … . Inasmuch as a court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is ” issue-finding, rather than issue-determination’ ” … , we reject defendants’ contention that they are entitled to summary judgment at this juncture … . Oddo v City of Buffalo, 2018 NY Slip Op 02041, Fourth Dept 3-23-18

NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, POLICE OFFICERS, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OR NORMAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD APPLIES IN THIS POLICE CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, POLICE OFFICERS, POLICE OFFICERS, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OR NORMAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD APPLIES IN THIS POLICE CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS,  QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OR NORMAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD APPLIES IN THIS POLICE CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (POLICE OFFICERS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OR NORMAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD APPLIES IN THIS POLICE CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FOURTH DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (POLICE OFFICERS, TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RECKLESS DISREGARD OR NORMAL NEGLIGENCE STANDARD APPLIES IN THIS POLICE CAR TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE (FOURTH DEPT))

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