You are here: / / DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER...
,

DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S CO-WORKER WHO INJURED PLAINTIFF, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF DID NOT GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY ON THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S PART (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, modifying Supreme Court, granted the defendant general contractor’s motion for summary judgment in this common law negligence and Labor Law 200 action. The Fourth Department further found that the plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) and Vehicle and Traffic Law 388 causes of action were properly dismissed. Plaintiff worked for the property owner, GTO, and did not work for defendant general contractor. Plaintiff was injured by a GTO  co-worker who was using a piece of equipment owned by the defendant (a skid steer used in landscaping work). The defendant did not exercise supervisory control over the skid steer operator and demonstrated entrusting the skid steer to the co-worker did not constitute negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument. The plaintiff, a landscaper, was not engaged in construction work within the meaning of Labor Law 241(6) and the skid steer was not operated on a public highway within the meaning of the Vehicle and Traffic Law:

Here, the evidence submitted by defendant established that plaintiff and the coworker were both employed by GTO, not by defendant. They were performing landscaping work in the parking lot of the complex, and were not involved in the construction work that was being performed by defendant. Defendant did not give any instructions to plaintiff and the coworker about what work to perform or how to perform their work, and no one from GTO was required to use the skid steer to perform his or her duties. The coworker chose to use the skid steer to move topsoil, and defendant permitted him to do so for such use. Although we are mindful that there might be circumstances in which a party may be said to exercise control over the manner of work based on the provision of the equipment to be used, we conclude that defendant did not exercise such control in this case … . The fact that defendant allowed a GTO employee to use its equipment to perform work on the grounds did not give defendant supervisory control over the manner in which the landscaping work was being performed by the GTO employees. To the contrary, the record establishes that defendant exercised no supervisory control over the landscaping work that was being performed by plaintiff and the coworker and, thus, defendant cannot be held liable for any injuries that were caused by the manner in which that work was being performed. Calvert v Duggan & Duggan Gen. Contr., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 01841, Fourth Dept 3-16-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S CO-WORKER WHO INJURED PLAINTIFF, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF DID NOT GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY ON THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S PART (FOURTH DEPT))/GENERAL CONTRACTOR (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S CO-WORKER WHO INJURED PLAINTIFF, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF DID NOT GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY ON THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S PART (FOURTH DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER THE PLAINTIFF OR PLAINTIFF’S CO-WORKER WHO INJURED PLAINTIFF, THE FACT THAT DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED THE EQUIPMENT WHICH INJURED PLAINTIFF DID NOT GIVE RISE TO LIABILITY ON THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR’S PART (FOURTH DEPT))

You might also like
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE PLACEMENT OF THE SCAFFOLD OR THE ABSENCE OF RAILINGS.
Restitution to Police Department Re: Expenses of Drug Bust Proper
Conditioning Co-Defendant’s Plea on a Promise Not to Testify in Defendant’s Trial Is a Denial of the Right to Present a Defense
IN THIS CAR ACCIDENT CASE, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RELEASE SHE SIGNED WAS THE RESULT OF MUTUAL MISTAKE CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF HER INJURIES (FOURTH DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) COVERAGE WAS GREATER THAN THE BODILY INJURY COVERAGE IN THE TORTFEASOR’S POLICY; SO THE SUM PROVISION OF PLAINTIFF’S POLICY WAS TRIGGERED (FOURTH DEPT).
WHETHER A SUCCESSFUL MOTION TO DISMISS COULD HAVE BEEN MADE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS PURSUANT TO CPL 40.20 COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DETERMINED ON DIRECT APPEAL, THEREFORE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING (FOURTH DEPT).
NO DEMONSTRATION A PARTICULAR INTERPRETATION OF AN AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT WAS THE ONLY FAIR INTERPRETATION; THEREFORE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY DENIED.
PLAINTIFF’S TITLE IX AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION, BASED ON ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE BY A TEACHER IN 1972 AND 1973, ARE TIME-BARRED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FIND A FOSTER HOME FOR A FAMILY’S... SOPHISTICATED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS...