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ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, modifying Supreme Court, in a decision dealing with several substantive insurance and employment issues not summarized here, determined that plaintiff, as the beneficiary of her husband’s life insurance policy, had sufficiently alleged she was in a relationship close to privity such that the insurance agent (Pontillo) and his employers owed her a duty of care. Plaintiff’s suit stemmed from the insurers’ denial of coverage based upon material misrepresentations in the decedent’s application (not mentioning substance abuse):

Plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of the ReliaStar policy from the moment when decedent applied for the policy. She further alleged that she was linked to Pontillo by his status as a family member and trusted financial advisor and that Pontillo knew not only that the policy was intended to ensure plaintiff’s financial well-being in the event of decedent’s death, but that she would rely upon his expertise in preparing a valid application for it. Accepting these allegations as true, they show “an affirmative assumption of a duty of care to a specific party, [plaintiff,] for a specific purpose, regardless of whether there was a contractual relationship” … . As Supreme Court correctly determined, this alleged “reliance by . . . plaintiff that was ‘the end and aim of the transaction'” … constituted “a relationship so close as to approach that of privity” and created a duty of care toward her that permitted a negligence claim against Pontillo and his purported employers … . Vestal v Pontillo, 2018 NY Slip Op 01236, Third Dept 2-22-18

INSURANCE LAW (ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (INSURANCE LAW, ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT))/PRIVITY (INSURANCE LAW, NEGLIGENCE, (ACCEPTING THE ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE FOR PURPOSES OF A MOTION TO DISMISS, INSURANCE AGENT AND HIS EMPLOYERS OWED PLAINTIFF, THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S LIFE INSURANCE POLICY, A DUTY OF CARE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, RELATIONSHIP WAS CLOSE TO PRIVITY (THIRD DEPT))

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