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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined there was a question of fact whether a resident exercised independent judgment in this medical malpractice case, making the resident and his employer (the hospital) potentially liable. Plaintiff’s decedent was intoxicated when given Valium:

Plaintiff’s decedent was brought into St. Barnabas Hospital by the police in an intoxicated and agitated condition. He was then chemically sedated with Valium. Two and one-half hours later, he “flatlined,” and, while resuscitative efforts were made, he did not awaken and was declared “brain dead” four days later.

Appellants contend that Dr. McGrath cannot be held liable for medical malpractice because, as a resident, he did not exercise independent medical judgment when he chose the type and dosage of sedative to use on decedent. However, the deposition testimony of the attending physician, defendant Dr. Rao, raised an issue of fact as to whether Dr. McGrath was permitted to, and in fact did, exercise independent medical judgment in deciding on the amount and type of sedation to administer, so that he may be held liable, and St. Barnabas Hospital may be held vicariously liable … . Burnett-Joseph v McGrath, 2018 NY Slip Op 01137, First Dept 2-15-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/RESIDENTS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))/HOSPITALS (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER RESIDENT EXERCISED INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, MAKING THE RESIDENT AND HOSPITAL POTENTIALLY LIABLE (FIRST DEPT))

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