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PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, DESPITE A 30 MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN VISITS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, over a three-judge dissent, determined that plaintiff had raised a question of fact about whether the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the statute of limitations in this medical malpractice action, despite a 30-month period between visits. Decision holding that a gap in treatment longer than the statute of limitations precludes the application of the continuous treatment doctrine should not be followed:

Plaintiff saw defendant over the course of four years, underwent two surgeries at his hand, and saw no other doctor for her shoulder during this time. She returned to him after the thirty-month gap, discussed yet a third surgery with him, and accepted his referral to his partner only because defendant was no longer performing such surgeries. Plaintiff’s testimony regarding feeling discouraged with defendant’s treatment does not demonstrate as a matter of law that she never intended to return to his care; in fact, her testimony reveals that she considered defendant her only doctor during this time. Nor does the fact that defendant repeatedly told plaintiff she should return “as needed” foreclose a finding that the parties anticipated further treatment. Notably, Plaintiff’s injury was a chronic, long-term condition which both plaintiff and defendant understood to require continued care. Each of plaintiff’s visits to defendant over the course of seven years were “for the same or related illnesses or injuries, continuing after the alleged acts of malpractice” … . As to the 30-month period between visits, we have previously held that a gap in treatment longer than the statute of limitations “is not per se dispositive of defendant’s claim that the statute has run” … . To the extent that lower courts have held to the contrary … , those cases should not be followed. Lohnas v Luzi, 2018 NY Slip Op 01114, CtApp 2-15-18

NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, DESPITE A 30 MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN VISITS (CT APP))/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, DESPITE A 30 MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN VISITS (CT APP))/CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, DESPITE A 30 MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN VISITS (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, DESPITE A 30 MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN VISITS (CT APP))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASE, DESPITE A 30 MONTH PERIOD BETWEEN VISITS (CT APP))

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