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DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUING COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY A PROPERTY EXECUTION, IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE JUDGMENT WILL BE A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant did have standing to move to vacate a default judgment on the ground that the court which issued the judgment did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The judgment had been satisfied by a property execution on the defendant’s bank account:

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Where, as here, a defendant moves to vacate a default judgment on the ground that the court that rendered the judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant … a finding in favor of the defendant would mean that the judgment was “a nullity” . It necessarily follows that, “if a judgment is a nullity, it never legally existed so as to become extinguished by payment” … . …

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In addition, inasmuch as plaintiff levied the judgment amount with interest by a property execution on defendant’s bank account, we conclude that defendant did not voluntarily pay and satisfy the judgment … . Thus, it cannot be said that she waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction … . Cach, LLC v Ryan, 2018 NY Slip Op 00755, Fourth Dept 2-2-18

 

DEBTOR-CREDITOR (DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUING COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY A PROPERTY EXECUTION, IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE JUDGMENT WILL BE A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PERSONAL JURISDICTION, DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUING COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY A PROPERTY EXECUTION, IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE JUDGMENT WILL BE A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENT (PERSONAL JURISDICTION, (DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUING COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY A PROPERTY EXECUTION, IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE JUDGMENT WILL BE A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT))/PERSONAL JURISDICTION (DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUING COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY A PROPERTY EXECUTION, IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE JUDGMENT WILL BE A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT))

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