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SIGN ON A LIGHT POLE, WHICH PLAINTIFF STRUCK WHEN JUMPING TO CATCH A BALL, WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the sign which plaintiff struck when jumping to catch a ball was an open and obvious condition which was not actionable. The sign was six feet seven inches from the ground attached to a light pole:

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“A landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining [its] property in a safe condition under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the potential injuries, the burden of avoiding the risk, and the foreseeability of a potential plaintiff’s presence on the property” … . “[An] owner, however, has no duty to protect against an open and obvious condition provided that, as a matter of law, the condition is not inherently dangerous” … . Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the sign that the plaintiff came into contact with was open and obvious, as it was not only readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, but was known to the plaintiff prior to the accident and, as a matter of law, was not inherently dangerous … . Contrary to his contentions on appeal, the plaintiff, in opposition, failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the sign was inherently dangerous. Genefar v Great Neck Park Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 08812, Second Dept 12-20-

 

NEGLIGENCE (OPEN AND OBVIOUS, SIGN ON A LIGHT POLE, WHICH PLAINTIFF STRUCK WHEN JUMPING TO CATCH A BALL, WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT))/OPEN AND OBVIOUS (NEGLIGENCE, SIGN ON A LIGHT POLE, WHICH PLAINTIFF STRUCK WHEN JUMPING TO CATCH A BALL, WAS A NON-ACTIONABLE OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SECOND DEPT))

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