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FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined this foreclosure proceeding was properly dismissed for failure to comply with a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 (b)(3):

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Where, as here, a plaintiff has been served with a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216(b)(3), that plaintiff must comply with the demand by filing a note of issue or by moving, before the default date, either to vacate the demand or to extend the 90-day period … . The plaintiff failed to do either within the 90-day period. Therefore, in order to excuse the default, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a justifiable excuse for its failure to timely file the note of issue or move to either vacate the demand or extend the 90-day period, as well as a potentially meritorious cause of action… . Nevertheless, it has been said that CPLR 3216 is “extremely forgiving” … , “in that it never requires, but merely authorizes, the Supreme Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action based on the plaintiff’s unreasonable neglect to proceed” … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the action insofar as asserted against him. The plaintiff took no action whatsoever in the five years from the time the case was released from the foreclosure settlement part on October 15, 2009, until the defendant served his 90-day demand on October 10, 2014. Moreover, after failing to comply with the 90-day deadline, the plaintiff took no action for five months before belatedly filing a note of issue. The plaintiff failed to provide a justifiable excuse for its delay in filing a note of issue and failed to demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action. The plaintiff’s further contention that dismissal was too harsh a sanction, and that a lesser sanction was more appropriate under the circumstances, is unavailing, given the plaintiff’s “pattern[ ] of persistent neglect, a history of extensive delay, evidence of an intent to abandon prosecution and lack of any tenable excuse for such delay”  … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Inga, 2017 NY Slip Op 08810, Second Department 12-20-17\

 

FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3216(b)(3) (FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))/ABANDONMENT OF ACTION (CIVIL PROCEDURE, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, FORECLOSURE ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 90-DAY DEMAND AND OVERALL DELAY AND NEGLECT (SECOND DEPT))

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