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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO FILE A LATE ANSWER PURSUANT TO CPLR 3012 AFTER A DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY DENIED, FIVE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED EXPLAINED, ALLEGATION DEFENDANTS WERE CHEATED WAS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined defendants’ motion to file a late answer in this foreclosure proceeding was properly denied. Shortly after giving their son, Luigi, powers of attorney, Luigi took out a mortgage to buy a condominium, using his parents’ (defendants’) home as collateral. Luigi defaulted and eventually the foreclosure action was started. After a default in the foreclosure proceedings, the defendants hired counsel and moved to file a late answer. The First Department went through each of the five factors to be considered, noting that the defendants’ claim to have first learned of the mortgage when they were served in the foreclosure action was not credible, and the allegation defendants were cheated by their son is not a defense (the powers of attorney were not fraudulently obtained):

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Under CPLR 3012(d), a trial court has the discretionary power to extend the time to plead, or to compel acceptance of an untimely pleading “upon such terms as may be just,” provided that there is a showing of a reasonable excuse for the delay. In reviewing a discretionary determination, the proper inquiry is whether the court providently exercised its discretion.

In Artcorp Inc. v Citirich Realty Corp. (140 AD3d 417 [1st Dept 2016]), we adopted the factors set forth in Guzetti v City of New York (32 AD3d 234, 238 (id.) [1st Dept 2006] [McGuire, J., concurring]) as those that “must . . . be considered and balanced” in determining whether a CPLR 3012(d) ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. Those factors include the [*4]length of the delay, the excuse offered, the extent to which the delay was willful, the possibility of prejudice to adverse parties, and the potential merits of any defense … . * * *

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Of these five factors, three — – the lack of a potential meritorious defense, which is the most notable, the length of the delay, and the willfulness of the default — weigh against granting the motion. The remaining factors, whether the delay was excusable and whether there was any possibility of prejudice to an adverse party, are arguably neutral. Therefore, considering and weighing the five Artcorp/Guzzetti factors, we conclude that Supreme Court properly denied the … motion. Emigrant Bank v Rosabianca, 2017 NY Slip Op 08716, First Dept 12-14-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (LATE ANSWER, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO FILE A LATE ANSWER PURSUANT TO CPLR 3012 AFTER A DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY DENIED, FIVE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED EXPLAINED, ALLEGATION DEFENDANTS WERE CHEATED WAS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT))/LATE ANSWER (DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO FILE A LATE ANSWER PURSUANT TO CPLR 3012 AFTER A DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY DENIED, FIVE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED EXPLAINED, ALLEGATION DEFENDANTS WERE CHEATED WAS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO FILE A LATE ANSWER PURSUANT TO CPLR 3012 AFTER A DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING WAS PROPERLY DENIED, FIVE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED EXPLAINED, ALLEGATION DEFENDANTS WERE CHEATED WAS NOT A DEFENSE (FIRST DEPT))

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