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GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing the appellate division, over a two-judge concurring opinion, determined a Georgia burglary statute was equivalent to a New York violent felony and therefore defendant was properly sentenced as and second violent felony offender. The Georgia statute does not explicitly include intent as an element. However, a lesser included offense (the Georgia criminal trespass statute) in the Georgia includes a “knowingly” element:

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Under Georgia statutory law, “[a] crime is included in another crime” … — i.e., a crime is a lesser included offense of another crime — when, among other things, “[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charged” … . …

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Georgia statutory law further provides that “[a] person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority . . . [e]nters upon the land or premises of another person . . . for an unlawful purpose” … . Georgia case law, in turn, provides that criminal trespass is (and was at the time defendant violated the subject Georgia statute) a lesser included offense of burglary … . Inasmuch as the “lesser” Georgia crime of criminal trespass contains a “knowingly” mens rea … , the “entry” component of the “greater” Georgia burglary statute in question … necessarily must have a culpable mental state of at least “knowingly.” In other words, the mental state for the greater crime logically cannot be less than the mental state for the lesser crime and, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Georgia crime corresponds to a New York violent felony … . People v Helms, 2017 NY Slip Op 08160, CtApp 11-20-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP))/SENTENCING (SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER, GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP))/SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER (SENTENCING, GEORGIA BURGLARY STATUTE WAS EQUIVALENT TO A NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONY DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPLICIT INTENT ELEMENT BECAUSE THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INCLUDED A KNOWINGLY ELEMENT (CT APP))/

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