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You are here: Home1 / Contract Law2 / SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES...
Contract Law, Family Law

SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined the separation agreement should not have been interpreted to require that the cost of college tuition be split 50-50. The agreement simply capped each party’s contribution at 50%. Family Court must determine the proper contribution based upon resources. The wife’s failure to pay anything, however, violated the agreement:

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Here, the parties agreed to “share in the costs of the child’s higher education,” with such contribution being capped at 50% of tuition at a state university, plus the cost of reasonable living expenses. By its plain language, the disputed provision unequivocally demonstrates that the parties intended to encourage and facilitate the child’s pursuit of a college degree and to make some financial contribution — up to, but not necessarily equaling, 50% of the total cost of tuition at a state university — toward that pursuit. In agreeing to contribute, the parties did not use language such as “split” or “50-50,” despite such language appearing elsewhere in the separation agreement, including in the sections addressing dependent care expenses and the cost of health insurance coverage. Given the appearance of such language elsewhere in the agreement, its absence in the relevant provision is telling, as it suggests that the parties did not intend, as Family Court found, to equally split the total cost of the child’s college tuition — subject to the cap — and living expenses … .. Furthermore, while the separation agreement provided that each party’s financial exposure would not exceed the tuition cap, it stopped short of defining the parties’ respective obligations. The absence of language defining their obligations does not render the provision ambiguous. Rather, by its omission, it is apparent that the parties contemplated a later agreement between themselves and, failing that, a subsequent determination by the court as to their respective contributions … .Thus, while we agree that the mother’s failure to contribute anything toward the cost of the child’s college education constituted a willful violation of the separation agreement, Family Court erred in concluding that the parties intended to equally share the total cost of the child’s college tuition and living expenses, subject to the tuition cap, and entering a judgment against the mother in the amount of $28,377.50. Matter of Dillon v Dillon, 2017 NY Slip Op 08062, Second Dept 11-15-17

 

FAMILY LAW (SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))/CONTRACT LAW (FAMILY LAW,  SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO , OLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))/SEPARATION AGREEMENT (FAMILY LAW, CONTRACT LAW, SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))/COLLEGE EXPENSES (FAMILY LAW, SEPARATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED BOTH PARENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO COLLEGE EXPENSES BUT DID NOT INDICATE HOW MUCH EACH PARTY SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, AGREEMENT BREACHED BY WIFE’S FAILURE TO PAY ANYTHING, FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE EACH PARENT’S APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTION (THIRD DEPT))

November 15, 2017
Tags: Third Department
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