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UNEXPECTED ABSENCE OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AFTER ARRESTING OFFICERS TESTIFIED ABOUT THE WITNESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDANT’S ARREST DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined, in the interest of justice (error not preserved), the defendant was deprived of his right to confront a witness against him. A witness to the stabbing, Torres, could not be located and did not testify at the trial. Before it was clear Torres would not testify, two officers had already testified to facts that made it obvious Torres had identified the defendant as the perpetrator:

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The record reveals … that the trial court understood full well the risk that the jurors, based on the detailed testimony of the arresting officers, might conclude that Torres—now a nontestifying witness—had identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators. Before summations, the court expressly warned both sides: “if I find that either of you are making any representation to this jury that Mr. Jose Torres made an identification of the defendant you will regret it.” Later, the court again warned the prosecutor in the following terms: “[S]ince Jose Torres did not testify, there is no way you are going to argue to this jury or infer to this jury in any way, shape or form that Jose Torres made an identification. Because that’s clearly the only import of your subsequent questioning about what did you do afterwards? Of course, the defendant got arrested. So it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to understand Jose Torres obviously identified something in this case.”

Both sides followed the court’s instructions during summations. However, during the jury’s deliberations, the jurors specifically requested a readback of [a police officer’s] testimony regarding “what Jose Torres told him relating to the perpetrator’s identification and what happened when he identified the defendant.” The requested testimony was read to the jury without any limiting instruction.

Under the unusual circumstances presented, the jury’s note demonstrates that the risk foreshadowed by the trial court had materialized, namely, that the jury had inferred from the arresting officers’ testimony that Torres had identified the defendant as one of Rivera’s attackers. Although neither side can be faulted for the introduction of the arresting officers’ testimony at a time when everyone believed in good faith that Torres would testify, once it became clear that Torres would not be produced as a witness, the arresting officers’ testimonial hearsay regarding the information conveyed to them by Torres violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him … . People v Tavarez, 2017 NY Slip Op 07756, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (UNEXPECTED ABSENCE OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AFTER ARRESTING OFFICERS TESTIFIED ABOUT THE WITNESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDANT’S ARREST DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW,  (UNEXPECTED ABSENCE OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AFTER ARRESTING OFFICERS TESTIFIED ABOUT THE WITNESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDANT’S ARREST DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, CONFRONTATION, UNEXPECTED ABSENCE OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AFTER ARRESTING OFFICERS TESTIFIED ABOUT THE WITNESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDANT’S ARREST DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, INTEREST OF JUSTICE, UNEXPECTED ABSENCE OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AFTER ARRESTING OFFICERS TESTIFIED ABOUT THE WITNESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDANT’S ARREST DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT))/CONFRONTATION CLAUSE (CRIMINAL LAW, UNEXPECTED ABSENCE OF A PROSECUTION WITNESS AFTER ARRESTING OFFICERS TESTIFIED ABOUT THE WITNESS’S INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENDANT’S ARREST DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, CONVICTION REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT)

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