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MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED, INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (in part) Supreme Court, determined one of defendant’s motions for a directed verdict was premature because plaintiff had not finished presenting proof, a second motion for a directed verdict was properly granted based upon admissions made by plaintiff’s witness, and a cross-claim based upon an indemnification agreement failed because the agreement purported to indemnify a party for its own negligence (in violation of the General Obligations Law). With respect to the premature motion for a directed verdict, the court wrote:

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“Any party may move for judgment with respect to a cause of action or issue upon the ground that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, after the close of the evidence presented by an opposing party with respect to such cause of action or issue, or at any time on the basis of admissions.”

In interpreting this provision, this Court has held that the requirement that a party opposing a directed verdict motion must have closed its presentation of evidence “must be strictly enforced” (Griffin v Clinton Green S., LLC, 98 AD3d 41, 46 [1st Dept 2012]). Further, we have held that “the grant of a dismissal [pursuant to CPLR 4401] prior to the close of the opposing party’s case will be reversed as premature, even if the ultimate success of the opposing party in the action is improbable” … . This Court in Griffin emphasized the importance of each party being “afford[ed] . . . a day in court” … . * * *

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[Defendant] essentially asks us to endorse a system whereby a party can make a directed verdict motion at any time during trial, so long as the party opposing the motion has put in some unspecified quantum of evidence that, though it may not have been everything the opposing party intended to put in, was sufficient for the trial court to determine that there were no issues of fact and it could decide for the movant as a matter of law. We decline to do so. 11 Essex St. Corp. v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2017 NY Slip Op 06709, First Dept 9-28-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))/DIRECTED VERDICT, MOTION FOR  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))CONTRACT LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT  (INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT VOID UNDER GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW (FIRST DEPT))/EVIDENCE  (MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT MADE BEFORE PLAINTIFF CLOSED ITS CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSIONS PROPERLY GRANTED (FIRST DEPT))

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