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DEFENDANT, AN ATTORNEY, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS ACTION WHICH INCLUDED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE ATTORNEY FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant (Feinsliver) , an attorney, should not have been disqualified from representing himself in an action which included a cause of action against the attorney for legal malpractice:

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… [T]he plaintiff commenced this action against Feinsilver and other entities related to Feinsilver. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, breach of fiduciary duties, breach of contract, fraud, and legal malpractice. The defendants interposed various counterclaims.

… [T]he plaintiff moved to disqualify Feinsilver and his law firm, The Feinsilver Law Group, from representing the defendants in this action. … Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the motion with respect to Feinsilver himself, disqualifying him from representing any of the defendants, including himself. …

An attorney, like any other litigant, has the right, both constitutional… and statutory … to self-representation. Although the right is not absolute, any restriction on it must be carefully scrutinized … . Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any compelling reason why Feinsilver should not be allowed to represent himself in this action … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in disqualifying Feinsilver from representing himself in this action … . Herczl v Feinsilver, 2017 NY Slip Op 06528, 2nd Dept 9-20-17

 

ATTORNEYS (DEFENDANT, AN ATTORNEY, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS ACTION WHICH INCLUDED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE ATTORNEY FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE (SECOND DEPT))/LEGAL MALPRACTICE (DEFENDANT, AN ATTORNEY, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS ACTION WHICH INCLUDED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE ATTORNEY FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE (SECOND DEPT))/DISQUALIFICATION (ATTORNEYS, (DEFENDANT, AN ATTORNEY, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISQUALIFIED FROM REPRESENTING HIMSELF IN THIS ACTION WHICH INCLUDED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE ATTORNEY FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE (SECOND DEPT))

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